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Abstract
Essays on Clean Water Act (CWA) and Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA) Compliance
Sharaban Anica
This dissertation empirically examines three issues related to CWA and SDWA: 1) Financial
Assistance and Environmental Compliance; 2) Financial Assistance Priorities from the Clean Water
State Revolving Fund; and 3) Drinking Water Compliance during COVID-19 Pandemic.
Using the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System compliance and the Clean Water
State Revolving Funds (CWSRF) data for wastewater treatment plants in nine states between 2010
and 2018, chapter 2 examines a) the effect of non-compliance on the distribution and size of
awarded CWSRF loans, and b) the effects of the CWSRF provision and award size on post-funding
compliance. Funded facilities are found to have poorer compliance records than the unfunded ones
and that funded facilities decrease violations within two years after receiving financial support. On
average, a $50 million CWSRF loan decreases violations by one count within two post-funding years.
Adequate investment in wastewater infrastructure remains a critical challenge for environmental protection in the US. In Chapter 3, I examine states’ prioritization of investment in wastewater
treatment facilities using the Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRF) allocation and wastewater
treatment plant data from 2010 to 2019 from nine states. Discrepancies and consistencies between
regulators’ stated and revealed funding priorities are documented based on the records of intended
and observed allocation of CWSRF support. I find that states intend to and provide CWSRF assistance
to wastewater treatment plants with poorer Clean Water Act compliance records in previous years. I
also find that larger facilities are prioritized in intended as well as observed allocation of assistance.
Although impairment of discharge receiving streams is not a significant factor in assistance distribution plans, the observed allocation of funds is positively correlated with receiving stream’s impairment.
Poorer communities are prioritized in intended as well as observed assistance allocation. However,
income-based prioritization is weaker in states with greater corruption.
According to the USEPA, the COVID-19 pandemic adversely affected water systems’ operations due to supply chain disruptions, water workforce staffing shortages, financial effects, and operational difficulties. Such challenges for drinking water systems functioning need to be analyzed to
ensure current and future public health safety. In Chapter 4, I empirically examine SDWA violations
to identify environmental regulatory risks emerging from COVID-19 pandemic. Using annual data
from 2011 to 2020 for all 50 states, I observe that counties with more COVID cases experience decreased facility level SDWA health-based violations relative to the counties with fewer COVID cases.
Also, the reported number of health-based drinking water violations decreased after February 2020
when the pandemic hit US. The decrease in health-based violations can be a result of weakened monitoring or reporting (M&R) activities. SDWA monitoring and reporting violations deceased with
growth in the number of COVID cases.
Using mediation analysis, I observe that the direct effect of COVID on health-based drinking
water violations vanishes once I account for M&R violations as one of the regressors for health-based
violations. Thus, I conclude that COVID-19 had no direct effect on health-based violations but did
weaken monitoring and reporting activities. Staff and equipment shortages, limited access to sample

collection locations, and EPA's temporary enforcement discretion policy for regular monitoring activities are some of the possible channels that could have affected M&R activities during the pandemic.
On the other hand, staffing, chemical treatment, and operational budget shortage can also increase
the number of health-based violations. However, in the presence of degraded M&R activities, such
health-based violations can remain undetected. Our negative and significant estimate of the effect of
the number of COVID cases on health-based violations supports such possibility. We observe a positive and significant effect of COVID cases on M&R violations, which explains the decrease in health
violations when COVID cases increase.
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1.

Introduction
Protection of water quality is one of the primary objectives of environmental policy and reg-

ulation in the US. The Clean Water Act (CWA), in conjunction with the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), comprise the major water quality laws administered by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA). The CWA, since it was passed by Congress back in 1972, has been one
of the most prominent federal laws protecting the nation’s surface water quality. The SDWA was
originally passed by Congress in 1974 to protect public health by regulating the nation's drinking water supply. This research focuses on understanding the challenges of regulatory and financial programs under CWA and SDWA.
To finance publicly owned wastewater treatment and facilitate their compliance with CWA,
the Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRFs) program was introduced in 1987. The CWSRF
provides low-cost loans to a wide range of water quality infrastructure initiatives, including projects
aimed at improving compliance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permits (Copeland, 1999; Travis et al., 2004; Copeland, 2012). The EPA recommends distributing CWSRF based on waterbody value, the impairment of or threats to the waterbody, and the
effectiveness of the proposed projects (USEPA 2012). States’ priorities in allocating CWSRF assistance include wastewater infrastructural improvement need to maintain standards for temperature,
nutrients, and sediments, size and needs of impacted communities (GAO 2006). Different states prioritize these factors at differently .
Although considerable progress has been made, major water quality problems persist despite
more than a trillion dollars spent on abatement initiatives since the beginning of CWA (Keiser and
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Shapiro, 2019; Keiser et al., 2019). Concerns about the adequacy of the wastewater treatment infrastructure for maintaining or improving wastewater quality have been documented, emphasizing the
needed investments (USEPA, 2000a,b; USEPA 2016a; Ramseur, 2017). Despite spending $104 billion in CWA assistance since 1972, US needs as much as $271 billion over the next 20 years to meet
the CWA’s water quality objectives for wastewater infrastructure (Ramseur, 2018). The Clean Water
State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) is a major financing mechanism but is insufficient for meeting the
water quality goals of the CWA (USEPA 2016a). Therefore, it is important to examine how states
prioritize and distribute scarce financial resources for investments in wastewater treatment facilities.
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), under the CWA, maintains point source discharge permits covering a list of regulated water pollutants. The NPDES permits limit the amount of each regulated pollutant that a facility may discharge and specify the monitoring and reporting requirements that form the basis for enforcement (Gaba, 2007; Chakraborti and
McConnell, 2012). Wastewater treatment facilities’ ability to comply with the NPDES permit requirements and to protect its water quality is directly dependent on adequate funding (Ramseur,
2017).
In order to examine connections between the CWSRF and NPDES compliance, I use
NPDES permit violation data to examine the effect of the CWSRFs on wastewater treatment plants’
compliance with the CWA in the short run. I use observations from wastewater treatment facilities
between 2010 and 2018 in nine states for which facility-level CWSRF data are available. The objective of this study is twofold. First, I examine the distribution of support from the CWSRFs across
wastewater treatment plants in terms of prior violations. Are funds allocated to poorly performing
facilities with greater numbers of NDPES permit violations? Second, I evaluate the efficacy of
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CWSRF assistance in mitigating NPDES permit violations. Do CWSRF loans reduce NPDES permit violations in subsequent years?
I take advantage of the two-phase CWSRF distribution process to examine the consistency
between stated and revealed priorities in CWSRF distribution in chapter 3. Prior to distributing support to qualified facilities, state funding agencies must submit Intended Use Plans (IUPs) for approval by the EPA. The actual distribution of support often differs from the IUP stated lists. I investigate the consistencies and disparities between actual funding (listed in annual reports; ARs) and
the IUP lists. Our analysis considers the roles of non-compliance, observed environmental quality,
community status, and corruption.
Chapter 4 shifts away from CWA and focuses on regulatory compliance with the SDWA. In
this chapter, I evaluate the effect of COVID pandemic on drinking water compliance in under compromised operational capacity of the public water systems. External shocks such as the COVID-19
pandemic can impact the health-based compliance of drinking water systems in two principal ways.
First, health-based violations in public water systems (PWSs) may occur due to compromised operational capacity from shortages of chemicals, equipment, financing, and labor. Second, staffing and
supply shortages, lack of operational budgets, limited access to monitoring location and relaxed enforcement of environmental regulations can disrupt monitoring and reporting (M&R) activities and
increase M&R violations. Increases in M&R violations may lead to underreporting of health-based
violations. Hence, COVID- 19’s net impact on reported heath-based violations is ambiguous. I use a
mediation model (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Kenny et al., 1998; Judd and Kenny, 1981) to measure
the causal mechanisms behind the effect of the pandemic on health-based drinking water violations.
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Financial Assistance and Environmental Compliance: Evidence from
the Clean Water Act and the Clean Water State Revolving Fund
2.

2.1.

Introduction
Protection of water quality is one of the primary objectives of environmental policy and reg-

ulation in the U.S. Passed by Congress in 1972, the Clean Water Act (CWA) has been one of the most
prominent federal laws protecting the nation’s water resources and environmental quality. Although
significant progress has been made, major water quality challenges persist despite more than a trillion
dollars spent on abatement initiatives since the CWA (Keiser and Shapiro, 2019; Keiser et al., 2019).
Compliance of wastewater treatment plants with the CWA is a major component of efforts to improve
surface water quality in the U.S. Concerns about the adequacy of the wastewater treatment infrastructure, including investment needs, have been documented (USEPA, 2000a,b; USEPA 2016a; Ramseur,
2017)1.
In 1987, the Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRFs) program was introduced to facilitate compliance with the CWA. The purpose of the CWSRFs program is to provide low-cost loans
for a wide range of water quality infrastructure initiatives, including projects aimed at improving compliance with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits (Copeland, 1999;
Travis et al., 2004; Copeland, 2012). NPDES maintains point source discharge permits for a list of
regulated water pollutants and corresponding records of reported violations. These permits restrict
the discharge of regulated pollutants and specify monitoring and reporting requirements that form the
basis for enforcement (Helland, 1998a,b; Gaba, 2007; Chakraborti and McConnell, 2012).

By some estimates, wastewater treatment plants in the US will need $271 billion to meet CWA objectives
over the 20 years, and infrastructure affordability will remain to be an issue of great concern (Ramseur, 2017;
USEPA, 2016a)
1
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Despite the importance of financial support and the CWSRF program, the distribution and
the impact of the CWSRF loans have not been studied. In this paper, I examine the distribution of
financial assistance across wastewater treatment plants and the impacts on compliance with the
NPDES permits. The objective of this study is twofold. First, I examine the distribution of CWSRF
loans across wastewater treatment plants in terms of the likelihood of receiving the award and the size
of the awarded loans. In particular, I focus on the role of pre-funding compliance records. Is CWSRF
support allocated to poorly performing facilities with more NDPES permit violations? Second, I evaluate the efficacy of CWSRF assistance in mitigating NPDES permit violations. Do CWSRF loans
reduce NPDES permit violations in subsequent years? I examine the effects of CWSRF provision and
award size on post-award non-compliance.
Adequate wastewater infrastructure financing is critical for compliance with the NPDES permit requirements and protecting water quality (Ramseur, 2017). The CWSRF loans provide financial
assistance to municipal, state, inter-municipal, or interstate agencies for construction or maintenance
of publicly owned treatment works; for construction, repair, or replacement of decentralized
wastewater treatment systems; for reduction, treatment, or recapture of stormwater or subsurface
drainage water; for implementation of water conservation, efficiency, or reuse measures aimed at reducing the demand for publicly owned treatment works capacity; for implementation of measures to
reduce energy consumption needs for publicly owned treatment works; and for measures supporting
reuse and recycling of wastewater, stormwater, or subsurface drainage water (Copeland, 1999; USEPA,
2016a; USEPA, 2020b). Although CWSRFs can be used for a variety of projects, GAO (2006) reports
that most of the funds (96% of approximately $50 billion) are used for wastewater treatment facilities
and conveyance projects. States rely heavily on CWSRFs to finance water quality improvement projects (GAO, 2006) and allocate funds according to various priorities, including wastewater infrastructure maintenance and replacement needs, population changes, EPA enforcement requirements, and
7

stricter EPA and state water quality standards for temperature, nutrients, and sediments. States are
required to match at least 20% of the federal contribution to the CWSRF loans.
The NPDES permits require facilities to sample their discharge and submit the Discharge
Monitoring Reports (DMRs), documenting permit violations, to the designated regulatory agency. The
EPA and state regulatory agencies also rely on inspections to advance compliance with the NPDES
guidelines and procedures. The EPA and the authorized state agencies have various enforcement tools
at their disposal against violators of NPDES permit requirements. For example, the regulators may
issue administrative orders which require facilities to correct the documented violations. The law also
authorizes the regulators to take up civil and criminal proceedings, including mandatory injunctions,
penalties, and jail sentences against individuals found to have violated the restrictions willfully.
I use the NPDES discharge violations data from wastewater treatment facilities in nine states
between 2010 and 2018 to examine the distribution of CWSRF support and the efficacy of financial
support for compliance with CWA. While most recent CWSRF annual reports are available for all 50
states, past reports that include facility-level data are available for only nine states. The distribution of
the CWSRF loans across facilities and over time presents a convenient setting that allows us to compare the performance of funded and unfunded facilities. In particular, I examine the difference between funded and unfunded facilities in terms of pre and post-funding compliance with the NPDES
permits. The pre-funding analysis of violations sheds light on the role of non-compliance in the distribution of CWSRF loans, including award counts and magnitudes. The post-funding analysis examines the efficacy of CWSRF awards in improving compliance with the NPDES permits conditional
on the award size. I also distinguish the effects of CWSRF awards provided once from the effects of
awards provided twice or more times on the post-funding compliance of funded facilities. Our focus
on the first two years of compliance post-funding only consider the short-term implication and can
undervalues the efficacy of CWSRF in improving compliance in the long run.
8

Water quality challenges vary across states and watersheds. Similarly, non-compliance of
wastewater treatment plants varies across regulated pollutants and regions. Regional authorities may
also focus on different pollutants depending on regional priorities and watershed improvement goals.
Therefore, I examine the aggregate number of violations instead of focusing on a subset of specific
contaminants. Our objective is to examine non-compliance broadly rather than for a particular pollutant. I focus on aggregate violations because the use of particular pollutant violations would be too
narrow to make conclusions about the relationship between CWSRF awards and compliance in general. Examination of the aggregate number of violations is more likely to capture the effect of noncompliance on funding and the effect of CWSRF loans on compliance than would an examination of
a subset of regulated pollutants.
I observe that the CWSRF loans are allocated to the facilities that appear to be in greater need
of support according to the number of cumulative violations. Funded facilities have more violations
than unfunded facilities before receiving CWSRF support. Conditional on controls, the results show
that violations one year before funding differ significantly across funded and unfunded facilities. Although funded facilities continue to have more violations post-funding than the unfunded facilities,
CWSRF loans reduce NPDES violations of funded facilities within two years of receiving support.
The lagged effect of loan provision on improved compliance beyond two years is expected because
updating wastewater infrastructure and treatment technologies takes some time after loans are provided (Keiser and Shapiro, 2019). I also observe that loan size matters for the impacts of one-time but
not repeated awards on non-compliance within the first two post-funding years. This result is likely
due to a temporal lag in the impact of the awards on non-compliance, especially for larger awards that
may require multiple years for project completion.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the
related literature. In Section 3, I review the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the data used
9

in the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Discussion and conclusions are provided in
the last section.

2.2.

A brief review of related literature
Although water quality in the U.S. has improved significantly since the enactment of the CWA,

the law has been one of the most controversial environmental regulations in the U.S. Studies like
Harrington & Malinovskaya (2015) and Keiser & Shapiro (2019) find that investments under the CWA
have helped reduce water pollution. Other studies document a lack of sufficient improvement in water
quality (Adler et al., 1993; Knopman and Smith, 1993; Harrington et al., 2009; Hayward, 2011; Smith
and Wolloh, 2012). The EPA reports that over half of stream miles in the U.S. still violate water quality
standards (Keiser and Shapiro, 2019). In a national assessment of 1.2 million wetland acres, 658 thousand acres were impaired for at least one designated use. Organic enrichment, oxygen depletion, mercury, arsenic and selenium are the top causes of impairment (USEPA, 2016b).
Limited existing literature examines the impact of financial support for water infrastructure.
Keiser & Shapiro (2019) assess the effectiveness of the CWA grants in reducing ambient pollution
and find that downstream water quality improves after facilities receive financial support. Harrington
& Malinovskaya (2015) find that between 2008 and 2012, the CWSRFs were not necessarily allocated
to water treatment plants with greater pollutant discharge. However, wastewater treatment plants that
receive financial assistance experience a greater reduction in pollutant discharge than unfunded plants.
Flynn and Marcus (2012) find that the CWA grants awarded to wastewater treatment plants improve
downstream infant health outcomes. Our work adds to the literature by evaluating the effects of the
CWSRF on compliance with NPDES permits under CWA. Unlike prior studies, I examine the cumulative violations across all pollutants regulated by the NPDES permits rather than individual regulated
pollutants.
10

Using the data from the EPA’s Grants Information and Control System (GICS), Keiser and
Shapiro (2019) examine the effects of the CWA investments on ambient pollutant concentrations.
Their results indicate that, on average, each CWA grant to municipal wastewater treatment plants
decreases downstream dissolved oxygen deficit, fecal coliforms, and the probabilities that downstream
waters are not fishable and swimmable. Harrington and Malinovskaya (2015) evaluate the performance
of the CWSRF in Iowa, Indiana, Maryland and Texas. Using the Clean Watersheds Needs Survey
(CWNS), the Clean Water Benefits Reporting System (CBR) and the Discharge Monitoring Report
(DMR) data, they examine the changes in discharge water quality across funded and unfunded
wastewater treatment plants. They found that loans awarded between 2008 and 2012 improved plant
performance in terms of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and organic nitrogen levels relative to
the plants in the corresponding states that did not receive the loans. McConnell and Schwarz (1992)
also argue that high BOD pollution by wastewater treatment plants is partly due to the lack of federal
subsidies.
Previous studies examine the effects of inspection and enforcement on compliance with the
CWA (Magat and Viscusi, 1990; Earnhart, 2004; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Gray and Shimshack,
2011). Gray and Shimshack (2011) provide a helpful review of empirical studies on environmental
monitoring and enforcement actions and find that monitoring and enforcement activities reduce emissions and violations. Magat and Viscusi (1990) examine compliance with water pollution regulations
in the U.S. pulp and paper industry between 1982 and 1985 and find that inspection improves compliance. Sanctions, and especially federal fines, have also reduced pollution by wastewater treatment
plants and chemical facilities in the 1990s (Earnhart, 2004). Shimshack and Ward (2005) empirically
explore the impact of enforcement efforts on biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended
solids (TSS) in pulp and paper production. They find a two-thirds reduction in statewide monthly
violation rates in the years following a fine. On the other hand, non-monetary sanctions, including
11

formal administrative orders, formal notices of non-compliance, and administrative consent orders,
have no effect on compliance. Malik (1993) shows that regimes with self-reporting can reduce regulatory costs if less frequent inspections are coupled with more consistent and frequent punishment.
However, failures and inconsistencies of the CWA enforcement have been documented in the popular
press, government reports, and the law and economics literature (Flatt, 1997; Sigman, 2005; Duhigg,
2009; GAO, 2009).
Previous literature also documents the effects of special interests and corruption on compliance with the NPDES permit system (Flatt, 1997; Grooms, 2015). Using the Permit Compliance System (PCS) and Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS) data, Grooms (2015) finds that
more corrupted states2 report larger decreases in documented violations than less corrupted states
after oversight transitions from federal to state control. Helland (1998a) examines the NPDES permit
violations and special interest groups’ influence on state-level regulation using data from 232 pulp and
paper plants from 1989 to 1993. He finds that state regulatory agencies are responsive to national and
local interest groups. The extent of state residents’ involvement in environmental organizations affects
violations and the probability of inspection. Grant and Grooms (2017) empirically examine nonprofit
environmental groups’ influence on compliance with environmental regulations under the NPDES
permit system. Their results suggest that the presence of nonprofit environmental organizations reduces the number of violations. They also find that nonprofit groups reduce government inspections
and severe effluent violations.
The EPA authorizes states to pursue enforcement actions under the CWA, which leads to
inconsistencies in CWA enforcement across states (Grooms, 2015). Unique environmental, financial,
and cultural settings lead to enforcement heterogeneity (Travis et al., 2004). Flatt (1997) argues that

Corruption is measured by the number of federal, state, and local public officials in each state/ year convicted in federal court of a corruption related crime. States are classified as corrupt or non-corrupt based on whether their average
corruption within a state across years is above or below the median corruption across states.
2
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without the threat of federal oversight, states are left to their own devices with no mechanism for
uniform enforcement of the CWA laws. Lack of federal efforts to ensure the consistency of enforcement has been documented (GAO, 2009). I consider the data from nine states with different environmental, regulatory and fiscal contexts. I control for state heterogeneity using fixed-effects specifications and defer a detailed examination of particular state-level differences to future studies.

2.3.

Empirical Approach
Our empirical approach takes advantage of the variation in NPDES non-compliance and

CWSRF loan provision across wastewater treatment plants. I start with a t-ratio comparison of facility
violations before versus after receiving financial support, and across funded and unfunded facilities.
Next, for the pre-funding violation analyses, I evaluate the difference between pre-funding compliance
of funded and unfunded facilities. The pre-funding analysis examines the differences in violations of
funded and unfunded facilities one, two and three years before CWSRF provision. I use Heckman’s
two-stage estimation to examine the effect of non-compliance on funding outcomes and award sizes.
I also use a difference model with violations as the dependent variable and future funding as the
independent variable for pre-funding compliance analysis. Last, I examine post-funding compliance
of funded and unfunded facilities using multiple period difference-in-difference (DiD) techniques
(Kirkpatrick and Bennear, 2014; Yamazaki, 2017). Post-funding analyses are repeated on a matched
group of funded and unfunded facilities using the propensity score matching technique. I include
binary funding outcomes and award sizes in pre-funding and post-funding analyses.
2.3.1. T-ratio analysis
The temporal variation in the provision of CWSRF loans across treatment plants enables a
comparison of violations within and across funded and unfunded groups before and after funding. I
start with a t-ratio comparison of a) mean annual violations of funded and unfunded facilities after
13

each funding year, b) mean annual violations of funded and unfunded facilities prior to each funding
year, c) mean annual pre and post-funding violations of funded facilities, and d) mean annual violations
of unfunded facilities before and after specific years.
Funded facility treatment groups include only the facilities funded in the respective year but
not in the previous two years. Each of the corresponding control groups includes facilities that are
not funded in the corresponding year, the preceding two, or the subsequent two years. For example,
the 2014 treatment group, comprised of the facilities financed in 2014 but not before, is compared to
the control group with facilities not funded between 2012 to 2016. The comparisons are made using
the average number of annual violations from three pre-funding years and three post-funding years to
assess differences between the funded and unfunded groups as well as changes within each group preversus post-funding. Each treatment year comparison excludes the violations from the corresponding
year because the relative timing of the CWSRF award and violation occurrence is difficult to establish.
Furthermore, violations documented in the same year as the CWSRF award are unlikely to be important determinants of CWSRF awards or to reflect the effects of loan provisions on compliance.
2.3.2. Pre-funding compliance
I explore the effect of pre-funding violations on CWSRF loan allocation by comparing the
pre-funding violations of funded facilities with corresponding violations of unfunded facilities. The
pre-funding analyses use violations as the independent variable to examine the effects on funding
decisions and award sizes. Heckman’s 2 stage model includes first stage binary funding outcomes and
second stage award magnitudes conditional on receiving CWSRF support. For funded facilities, I include CWSRF provision observations from 2010 to 2018 and compliance data from the corresponding
three pre-funding years. For example, to examine the distribution of CWSRF support in 2010, I use
compliance data from 2007 to 2009. Hence, our group of funded facilities includes those that received
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CWSRF support between 2010 and 2018. It would be preferable to ensure that those facilities did not
receive support before 2010. Unfortunately, I do not have data on CWSRF prior to 2010. For treatment years 2012 through 2018, I ensure that neither treatment nor control facilities received CWSRF
since 2010.
The Heckman model is used to examine the likelihood and magnitude of CWSRF in two
stages. Selection bias occurs when certain facilities are systematically included in the second stage
based on the first stage selection process. This can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates in the
second stage because the analysis is based on a censored sample. Heckman two-step selection model
is a standard approach in these types of circumstances (Little and Rubin, 2019; Becker et al., 2013;
Brounen and Kok, 2011). In the first stage, a probit model with state and year controls is used to
examine whether facilities receive CWSRF support.
Pr(𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1) = Φ(𝑞𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + β1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛑 𝑿𝑖𝑡 + δRF𝑖𝑠𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 )

(2.1)

where, Φ(·) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑡 takes the value
of 1 when a facility i in state s receives CWSRF loan in year t. 𝑄𝑠 and 𝜆𝑡 are state and year fixed effects.
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−22 , and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−3 are annual violations by facility i in state s in one, two and three years before
t. β1, β2 and β3 show the effect of lag violations on funding decisions. To account for the possibility
of some facilities receiving CWSRF loans in more than one year, repeated funding binary control, RF,
is included that takes value of 1 if the awarded loan is one of several loans and zero otherwise. This
variable is excluded from the second stage formulation because it is statistically insignificant and inclusion of at least one explanatory variable only in the selection equation is recommended (Sartori,
2003). X represents a vector of facility, county and state level time-variant controls. ε𝑖𝑡 is the standard
idiosyncratic disturbance term.
In the second stage, linear specification is used to examine the magnitude of assistance as
follows:
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𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + β1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝛑 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜗𝜓 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.2)

where, 𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the magnitude of the loan awarded to facility i in state s and period t. 𝛼𝑠 and 𝜆𝑡 are state
and year fixed effects. The inverse of Mills ratio, 𝜓 , is obtained from the first stage probit model. All
regressors from the first stage are used in the second stage regression except for repeated funding
dummy RF.
I also examine the prefunding compliance using panel count models including Poisson and
logit with violations as the dependent variable and CWSRF support in the future three years as explanatory variables. Poisson regressions use facility annual number of violations, while logit models
use transformed binary annual violation occurrence as dependent variables. Clearly, the purpose of
these regressions is not to imply a causal inference in terms of the effect of future funding on violations
in the preceding years. Instead, these regressions shed light on whether the facilities that are funded
in the future have more violations in the present. In other words, these models quantify differences
in the present, pre-funding violations between funded and unfunded facilities in the future. Although
these “difference” models are not very intuitive in terms of causal inference, they offer an additional
insight for the difference in prefunding compliance of funded and unfunded facilities. Therefore, the
results from these models are provided in the appendix.
I examine Heckman as well as count models because they use different empirical specifications
and data. The methods use different data because the dependent variable in the count difference models is violations in year t (2009-2015) and control variables, including facility size and county income
in year t, and future funding in t+1, t+2, and t+3. On the other hand, the dependent variable in the
Heckman models is funding in years 2010-2018 with lag violations, county income, facility size and
repeated funding dummy as control variables. Hence, the dependent variable and the controls for flow
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and income in the Poisson models are for 2009-2015.3 On the other hand, the dependent variable and
the controls for flow and income in the Heckman models are for 2010-2018. As a result, the data and
the number of observations differ across the two approaches. Hence, some differences in findings are
possible. Since the conclusions can differ, I feel that reporting the results from both approaches is
helpful for robustness' sake.
2.3.3. Post-funding compliance
The difference-in-difference (DiD) technique has been widely used to study similar intervention effects, where outcomes are compared over time and between treatment and control groups (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Brent et al., 2015; DeAngelo and Hansen, 2014; Finkelstein, 2007; Lavaine
and Neidell, 2017). Post-funding analysis exploits the DiD estimation techniques to compare the
NPDES permit violations across funded and unfunded facilities and across pre and post-funding periods. Provision of the CWSRF loans cannot be assumed to be random, as would be required for a
randomized experimental study with treatment and control groups. This is common in most social
science research based on observational data. Nevertheless, the DiD framework enables the analysis
of loan provision and non-compliance conditional on the parallel trends in violations of funded (treatment group) and unfunded (control group) facilities prior to providing CWSRF loans. I confirm that
the pre-treatment violation trends of funded and unfunded facilities do not differ significantly in most
cases based on the parallel trends tests. I also present the results from the matched DiD analyses
based on the nearest neighbor propensity score matching.
I proceed with the multiple-period (Kirkpatrick and Bennear, 2014; Yamazaki, 2017) analysis
of combined funding year treatments. I employ DiD models to compare the violations within and

2009 is the earliest violation I include because our funding variable starts from 2010 and I include 1, 2, and 3
years of future funding as independent variables.
3
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across funded and unfunded groups before and after CWSRF awards. The control group includes
facilities that are not funded within the corresponding pre-treatment, treatment, and post-treatment
periods, while the treatment groups include facilities that receive CWSRF in the corresponding year
but not in the preceding years. The treatment group facilities are funded in one or more years in the
relevant window.
The regressions use data from several pre-funding and two post-funding years and exclude the
data from the corresponding funding year for funded facilities. Observations for treatment facilities
in treatment years are not included in our analyses because relative timing of violations versus awards
could not be established within the treatment years. For the control group, all observations are included. I ensure that none of the facilities in our treatment or control groups receive CWSRF support
in pre-funding years.
I perform the DiD analysis using two samples: one includes only one-time funded facilities
between 2014 and 2016 as a treatment group, and the other includes facilities that received one or
more loans between 2012 to 2016 as a treatment group. Between 2014 and 2016, only ten facilities
received multiple awards. Therefore, I focus on singular awards in these models and ensure that pretreatment (2010-2013) funding is not provided to any of the included facilities. This analysis disregards
repeated funding and examines the effect of singular CWSRF awards. To account for multiple awards,
I use the second sample (2012-2016), which includes 105 facilities funded more than once. However,
the 2012-2016 analyses use observations from only two pre-funding years (2010 and 2011) for parallel
trend tests. Hence, the advantage of the 2014-2016 analysis focusing on singular awards is that these
models include four rather than two pre-funding years to confirm parallel trends of treatment and
control groups pre-treatment. On the other hand, 2012-2016 analysis includes repeatedly funded facilities but uses only two pre-treatment years for parallel trend confirmation. I confirm the parallel
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trends of treatment and control facilities for both approaches. Also, conventional and propensity score
matching-based DiD specifications are used for both (Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2013).
The effects of CWSRF loans on post-treatment compliance are examined in terms of discrete
funding and in terms of loan magnitude effects. First, I examine funding decisions disregarding the
magnitudes of the loans. Subsequently, I include the effects of the loan magnitudes.
Dynamic estimation with lagged dependent variable as a regressor can result in a correlation
between the unobserved effect and the dependent variable (Deininger et al., 2011). Therefore, I estimate our models conditional on both the initial value of the dependent variable and the facility level
average of the time-varying exogenous variables (Wooldridge 2005; Vesterberg 2018; and Deininger
et al. 2011). All models are estimated using the standard facility level random effects Poisson model.
2.3.3.1. Parallel Trend Assumption
The DiD analysis relies on the assumption that the control group serves as an adequate proxy
for the counterfactual outcome that would have been observed in the treatment group if the treatment
was absent (Ryan et al., 2015; Chan et al., 2017; Lai, 2017; Oakes and Kaufman, 2017). As is common
in observational data, I cannot test this assumption directly because I do not observe the treated group
in the absence of support from CWSRF. The identifying assumption in such a situation rests on the
parallel trends of outcomes in the treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment period (Wrenn
et al., 2016). This assumption holds if trends are similar across the treatment and control groups in
the absence of the treatment (Beatty and Shimshack, 2011).
The validity of the parallel trend assumption can be assessed by testing whether the differences
in pre-funding trends of violations between treatment and control facilities are statistically and economically indistinguishable from zero. I use equation (2.3) to test differences in trends during four
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pre-treatment years in the models for the singular awards made between 2014 and 2016 as follows
(Autor, 2003; Agarwal and Qian, 2014; Kearney and Levine, 2015; Cerulli and Ventura, 2019):
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α𝑠 + λ 𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑖,𝑡+3 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝑖,𝑡+4 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 + ε𝑖𝑡

(2.3)

where, 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the violation of facility I in state s at time t, λ and 𝛼 are time and state fixed effects. I
include an indicator for the three out of four pre-treatment periods and leave out the indicator for the
last pre-treatment period (t+1). 𝐹𝑖,𝑡+2 , 𝐹𝑖,𝑡+3 , 𝐹𝑖,𝑡+4 are 1 if facility i is funded 2, 3, or 4 years after.
Hence, the corresponding beta coefficients represent the prefunding difference in violations. Pretreatment indicators (𝛽1 , 𝛽2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽3 ) are expressed relative to the omitted period, which serves as the
base period for the parallel trends tests. If the trends in pre-treatment violations between treatment
and control facilities are similar during the pre-treatment periods, then 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 should be statistically insignificant (Kearney and Levine, 2015). 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 ) are 1 if facility i receives CWSRF one
(two) year(s) before t, and 0 otherwise. 𝛽4 (𝛽5) indicate the difference in violations between treatment
and control facilities one (two) years after receiving the CWSRF support relative to the benchmark
control group (Agarwal and Qian, 2014).
A similar formulation is used to evaluate two pre-treatment years’ violation differences in the
models that include singular and repeated awards made between 2012 to 2016 (equation 2.4). In this
formulation 𝛽1, 𝛽4 , and 𝛽5 is analogous to the corresponding coefficients in equation 2.3. 𝛽2 and 𝛽3
are absent from equation (2.4) because this model includes only two pre-funding years for parallel
trend analysis. However, this model includes 𝛽6 for repeated funding effect pretreatment and
𝛽7 and 𝛽8 for repeated funding effects post-treatment.
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α𝑠 + λ 𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛽4 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 +
ε𝑖𝑡 (2.4)
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2.3.3.2. Binary funding treatment DiD
The DiD strategy is applied in a setting with multiple periods and treatments (Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009). First, I focus on the effects of binary funding decisions disregarding the magnitudes of the loans and account for repeated awards using equation (2.5). Multiple indicator variables
reflect the heterogeneity in the lagged effects of funding provision on non-compliance in subsequent
years. The multi-period regression model for the combined treatment analysis examines the difference
in violations in the post-treatment years across treatment and control facilities.
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α𝑠 + λ 𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽21 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽22 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝜷3 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + ε𝑖𝑡
(2.5)
where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the violation by facility i in state s in year t. F and RF are the dummies for one-time
funding and for repeated funding respectively. 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 ) is 1 for facility-year observations with
one and only loan provided one (two) year(s) ago. Similarly, 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 ) is 1 for facility-year
observations with the last of the repeated awards provided one (two) year (s) ago. Hence, 𝛽11, and
𝛽12 show the effects of receiving a one-time award in treatment year t-1 and t-2 on violations in year
t. Similarly, 𝛽21, and 𝛽22 respectively show the effect of receiving awards in multiple years in treatment
years t-1 and t-2 on compliance in year t. α𝑠 is state fixed effect and λ 𝑡 is the year fixed effect. X is a
vector of facility and county level time-variant variables. ε𝑖𝑡 represents the standard idiosyncratic disturbance term.
2.3.3.3. Continuous funding treatment DiD
Next, the effects of the award size are examined using the following model, which expands
the previous specification by adding an interaction term for loan size.
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𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α𝑠 + λ 𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐶𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12 𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 𝐶𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽21 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐶𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽22 𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 𝐶𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝜷3 𝑿𝑖𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡

(2.6)

where the notation is consistent with the notations in equation 2.5, except that this model also includes
interaction terms between binary funding variables and corresponding award magnitude,
CWSRF. 𝐶𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 (𝐶𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2 ) indicates the magnitude of the loan provided to facility i one
(two) year(s) prior to year t. For the facilities that receive multiple loans, the repeated funding amount
is the total across multiple awards. 𝛽11 shows the magnitude effect of receiving support a year ago
when funding was made only once. Similarly, 𝛽12 shows the magnitude effect of receiving support
two years ago when funding was made only once. Interpretations for 𝛽21 and 𝛽22 are analogous except
that they respectively show the cumulative effects of multiple loans provided to facility i up to one
and two years before t.
2.3.3.4. Propensity score matching DiD
The DiD estimator is most suitable when treatment is random. However, treatment is often
not randomized in observational data. In such cases, matched control groups can be used to reduce
selection bias (Rubin, 2008). I use the propensity score matching (PSM) technique (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983) to control for unmeasured differences between the treatment and the control groups
(Heckman et al., 1997). The DiD-PSM approach relies on matching treatment and control subjects in
terms of observed characteristics to identify best match counterfactuals, making the common trend
assumption more plausible (Gebel and Voßemer, 2014).
I use a logit model to estimate the propensity score, which is the probability of receiving support from the CWSRF depending on several observable characteristics. The covariates include all
available control variables that can influence the probability of obtaining the CWSRF loans. Propensity
score matching entails forming matched sets of treatment and control subjects that share a similar
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value of the propensity score. I use the nearest neighbor matching technique to pair each treatment
facility with the twenty closest control facilities in terms of the propensity score (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). After matching, the observable characteristics should be balanced between treatment
facilities and matched control facilities. I formally test for the significance of differences in observable
characteristics between the treatment and the matched control facilities samples using t-tests.

2.4.

Data
I use data from 6,921 facilities in 9 states, including Arkansas, Arizona, California, Indiana,

Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont and West Virginia, from 2010 to 2018. The time frame of the
analysis is based on the availability of the CWSRF loan data. Table 2.1 shows the annual summary
statistics for the funded and unfunded facility-year observations. The funded group includes 3,362
facility-year observations, while the unfunded group includes 21,016 observations. The unfunded
group includes observations for the facilities which were verifiably not funded between 2010 and 2018.
Observations for the facilities that have no recorded funding but have missing data at least for one of
the years during this time frame, are excluded from Table 2.1. On the other hand, all available observations for the facilities that are funded at least once are included in Table 2.1 even if data for these
facilities are missing in some years. Rationale for this construction is to make sure that the funded
group includes facilities funded at least once, while the unfunded group includes only the facilities that
were never funded in this time frame.
The states included in our analysis vary in size, violations, and funding. Table A1 in the appendix provides summary statistics for violations, facility size, and funding broken down by state. For
example, West Virginia has the largest average violation count of 17 per facility per year, while Nebraska has the lowest at 2.2. Such variation across states in our sample can be helpful for generalizing
our findings. Still, generalization of the results requires caution. The mean violation in the U.S. (2) is
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comparable to the mean violations in some of the states in our sample. However, the range of annual
facility violations in our sample is between 0 and 166, while for the U.S. sample it is between 0 and
246. Similarly, the facilities in our sample are smaller than some of the facilities in other states.
Wastewater treatment plants’ violations data are obtained from the EPA’s ICIS-NPDES database. The Effluent Limit Exceedances database provides discharge monitoring self-reported data,
including violations of the NPDES permit effluent limits. The violations are reported per permit holding facility. I use the aggregate number of annual violations across different pollutants rather than
focus on individual effluents. The use of annual data mitigates the timing problem with violations and
associated reporting (Grant and Grooms, 2017). The quality of the data varies from state to state
(GAO, 2005; GAO, 2009).
The data on the CWSRF support received by the individual wastewater facilities are obtained
from the State Departments of Environmental Quality. The state environmental protection agencies
publish annual reports that identify all disbursements of financial support under the CWSRF program
in the respective year. I rely on these reports to identify the facilities that receive assistance.

Table 2.1 Summary statistics for wastewater treatment plants, 2010-2018
VARIABLES
Mean
Std. Dev.
Annual Violations per facility
5
10.40076
Water Flow [Mgal/ Year]
507
2597
Unfunded4
(N= 21,016)
Annual Number of Inspections
2
4
County Per Capita Personal Income ($)
39820
10603
Annual Violations per facility
6
12
Water Flow [Mgal/ Year]
1775
6433
Funded
(N= 3,362 )
Annual Number of Inspections
3
5
County Per Capita Personal Income ($1)
42093
13498

4

Min
0
1
0
17078
0
1
0
21423

Max
183
81452
48
134275
166
150881
28
134275

I have an unbalanced panel data set because not all facilities have data in each year.
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I include two years’ lagged violations, annual wastewater flow, annual numbers of inspection
activities, and county per capita income as facility-level covariates. Data on facility controls are obtained from the EPA’s ICIS-NPDES database, while the per capita income is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).

2.5.

Results
The results are presented in the following order. I first compare the compliance records of

funded and unfunded facilities using t-tests. Next, I report results from the pre-funding analysis and
from the post-funding DiD models. Post-funding DiD results include unmatched and matched sample models for robustness check. The unmatched models include all data, while the matched models
include nearest neighbor-based propensity score-matched data to address concerns about the nonrandom funding treatment.
2.5.1. T-ratio analysis
Table 2.2 shows the mean annual violations of funded and unfunded facilities two years before
and two years after each CWSRF assistance treatment year. The estimates in Table 2.2 are organized
across columns A, B, and C and rows 1, 2 and 3. Block A1 shows the mean annual numbers of violations by the funded facilities during the two years before receiving support from the CWSRF in the
respective years. Block B1 shows the corresponding non-compliance of the unfunded facilities. For
example, in 2013, 92 funded facilities5 had 6.4 violations per facility per year during 2011- 2012, while
the 5914 unfunded facilities had 3.5 annual violations per facility. Block C1 (C2) shows t-statistics for

Some of the facilities have missing compliance information in some years. If there is also no other information including pollutant specific permit limits, enforcement, or inspection, then the observation is treated as missing. Otherwise, I
treat the observation as a zero as compliance is mostly reported when violation exists. Missing data for some of the facilities in some of the years is the reason why the numbers of observations for the same treatment and control groups differ across pre-treatment (row 1) and post-post treatment (row 2) in Table 2.2.
5
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Table 2.2: T-tests for mean annual violations
A.
Year
Funded
2012
2013
Mean annual viola1 tions in prior two
years

2014
2015
2016
2012
2013

Annual mean viola2 tions in subsequent
two years

2014
2015
2016
2012
2013

Pair-wise t ratio for
3 before minus after
treatment

2014
2015
2016

3.3
N= 47
6.4
N= 92
7.65
N=80
4.23
N= 42
3.2
N= 54
7.69
N= 59
6. 2
N= 96
10.6
N= 77
5.3
N= 42
5.36
N= 51
-0.63
(1.30)
0.26
(1.50)
-1.4**
(1.79)
1.86*
(1.70)
-0.38
(1.10)

B.
Unfunded
3.9
N= 5243
3.5
N= 5914
3.9
N=6555
3.88
N= 6701
4.1
N= 6674
4.37
N= 5981
3.5
N= 5,323
4.3
N=5269
4.4
N= 6468
4.4
N= 5849
0.807
(1.30)
-10.75**
(0.04)
-10.29***
(0.39)
-3.69***
(0.04)
2.29**
(0.02)

C.
t-ratios
Funded vs. Unfunded
-0.46
(1.23)
2.42***
(0.90)
3.59***
(1.04)
0.25
(1.39)
0.07
(1.19)
2.59***
(1.27)
1.1
(0.98)
5.66***
(1.10)
-1.27
(1.77)
-0.44
(1.36)

the hypothesis that there is no significant difference in the mean annual violations during the two
years prior to (following) the loan provision year across funded and unfunded facilities. Blocks A3 and
B3 show the t-test statistics for the hypothesis that no statistically significant difference exists between
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the mean annual violations before and after the treatment years for funded and unfunded facilities,
respectively.
The results in block C1 show that the funded facilities have significantly higher numbers of
pre-funding violations than the unfunded facilities in two out of five loan provision (treatment) years.
These results support the hypothesis that in 2013 and 2014, CWSRF was provided to the facilities that
performed worse in terms of NPDES violations in the preceding years. However, block C2 shows
that the mean number of annual post-funding violations is also higher for the funded facilities than
for the unfunded facilities in two of the four treatment years. Based on these statistics, the efficacy of
CWSRF in reducing non-compliance is ambiguous because the funded facilities have more violations
than the unfunded facilities before as well as after funding. Block A3 shows a significant difference in
mean annual pre-funding and post-funding violations of the funded facilities in 2014. Similarly, block
B3 suggests a significant difference in mean annual pre-funding and post-funding violations of the
unfunded facilities from 2013 to 2016.
Conclusions about the efficacy of CWSRF loan provision are difficult to reach. First, it is
difficult to assess whether the CWSRF reduced the violations of the funded facilities relative to the
violations that would have been observed in the counterfactual case because non-compliance by the
funded facilities is not observed in the absence of funding. Second, the t-tests do not take into account
the confounding effects of other factors. Third, Table 2 comparisons of funded and unfunded facilities
before and after funding disregard the effects of repeated CWSRF provision. Therefore, I turn to the
multivariate regression analysis for a more detailed examination. Next, I present the results from the
pre-funding analysis, followed by post-funding parallel trend analysis and multi-period DiD results.
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2.5.2. Pre-funding compliance
I examine the role of non-compliance for CWSRF distribution by comparing pre-funding violations of funded and unfunded facilities. Table 2.3 presents the results from the Heckman 2-stage
selection models, including first step binary funding outcome (selection) and second step award magnitude (OLS) analysis. These models include all available observations regardless of whether a facility
has missing data in some of the years. Unlike Table 2.1 and the forthcoming post funding analysis
results, no observations are excluded from these regressions.
Table 2.3. Pre-funding violations

VARIABLES
Lag1 Violation
Lag2 Violation
Lag3 Violation
Water Flow

Model 1
Stage 1 (SelecStage 2
tion)
(OLS)
0.0153***
(0.00501)
0.00111
(0.00535)
0.00371
(0.00525)

463,738
(305,291)
-17,554
(176,040)
40,617
(201,703)

Rep. Fund Lag1

Per. C. Income

6.60e-05***
(1.03E-05)

2.479e+07
(1.799e+07)

Mills ratio

Number of Facilities

0.0177***
(0.00465)
0.00198
(0.00517)
0.00315
(0.00500)

1.504***
(0.184)
0.757***
(0.201)
-0.000101***
(5.82e-06)

Rep. Fund Lag2

Year Fixed Effect
State Fixed Effect
Observations

Model 2
Stage 1 (Selection)

Stage 2
(OLS)
113,240
(152,868)
10,092
(166,062)
-13,202
(180,608)

2,073***
(247.4)

-217.3
(261.6)
3.931e+06*
(2.326e+06)

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

35,463
7,353

604

32,773
7,166

582

Results of selection models 1 and 2 show pre-funding violation differences between funded
and unfunded facilities. The estimates suggest that facilities with more violations are more likely to
receive CWSRF assistance in a subsequent year. There is a statistical difference in violations of funded
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and unfunded facilities one year before receiving support. Facilities with more violations in t-1 are
more likely to be funded in year t than facilities with fewer violations in t-1. These results suggest that
perhaps prior non-compliance attracts the attention of regulators and signals the need for financial
support.
While the probability of a facility being funded depends on NPDES violations in the previous
year, Stage 2 results show that the magnitude of the award is not associated with non-compliance.
There is no statistical effect of non-compliance on the magnitude of the awards. Table 2.3 suggests
that funding decisions depend on facilities’ compliance in the previous year, but the magnitude of the
award may depend on other factors like the size of the facility. Our results show a statistically significant association between facility size and the award’s probability and magnitude. Larger facilities are
more likely to receive the awards and tend to receive larger grants. Larger treatment plants may be
prioritized because such facilities tend to be located in more populated areas (Keiser and Shapiro,
2019).
The Poisson and logit regressions results with violations as the dependent variables and future
funding as explanatory variables are provided in appendix table A2. I put these results in the appendix
because these models are not intuitive in terms of causal inference. Clearly, I do not mean to imply
that future funding outcomes influence non-compliance in the preceding years. Instead, these results
represent an additional angle of view on whether compliance of facilities funded in future periods
differs from compliance of future unfunded facilities. Statistical significance of funding in years t+1,
t+2 and t+3 support the hypothesis that facilities with poorer compliance records receive CWSRF
assistance. The results consistently show a statistical difference in violations of unfunded and eventually funded facilities 1, 2, and 3 years before the funding was received. These results hold even when
controlling for repeated provision of CWSRF awards in the preceding one or two years.
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2.5.3. Post-funding compliance
The results for the effect of CWSRF provision on facility violations are presented as follows.
First, I report the results from parallel trend analysis (table 2.4), followed by the results from binary
funding treatment DiD (Table 2.5) and continuous funding treatment DiD (Table 2.6). All results are
presented for matched and unmatched samples. Also, the results are presented for one-time funding
treatment in 2014-2016 and repeated funding treatment in 2012-2016. I include both of these results
in all tables because 2014-2016 treatment analysis has a longer pre-treatment period (2010-2013 as
opposed to 2010-2011) for parallel trend analysis, while the 2012-2014 treatment model accounts for
repeatedly funded facilities. The 2014-2016 treatment regression models exclude repeated funding
because only ten facilities received CWSRF support more than once in 2014-2016. Hence, Table 2.4
shows four models, and Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show eight models, half of which (models 2, 4, 6 and 8)
include control variables like facility’s size, previous compliance record and county income. The rest
(models 1, 3, 5 and 7) do not include additional controls. I include these models because, on the one
hand, the regressions without control variables have more observations. On the other hand, the regressions with additional controls account for additional factors besides the fixed effects and the treatment variables. Based on the DiD requirements, some of the available observations have to be excluded from the post-funding regressions. First, the facilities funded in the pre-treatment periods have
to be removed from the regressions because neither treatment and not control facilities can be funded
pre-treatment. Second, facilities with missing data in the pre-treatment years have to be removed from
the regressions to ensure that pre-treatment period includes only the facilities that were not funded
pre-treatment.
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2.5.3.1. Parallel trend analyses for post-funding DiD
Although the pre-funding year compliance results indicate that funded facilities tend to have
more violations in the pre-funding years than the unfunded facilities, the parallel trend assumption
requires a separate assessment. In particular, the results of pre-funding violations show that funded
facilities have more violations than unfunded facilities but do not necessarily reveal whether the trends
in violations differ between treatment and control facilities.
Table 2.4. DiD parallel trend test
Unmatched
Model 1
Model 2
Two year lead treatment effect
(funded once)
Three year lead treatment effect
(funded once)

Matched
Model 3

Model 4

Treatment Years
2014 to 2016

Treatment Years
2012 to 2016

Treatment Years
2014 to 2016

Treatment Years
2012 to 2016

0.0469
(0.0826)
0.236**
(0.0922)
0.453***
(0.0846)
-0.206**
(0.0871)
-0.132
(0.0861)

-0.0069
-0.058

0.0425
(0.159)
0.202
(0.232)
0.379
(0.260)
-0.223
(0.185)
-0.186
(0.204)

(0.01)
(0.06)

Four year lead treatment effect
(funded once)
One year lag treatment effect
(funded once)
Two year lag treatment effect
(funded once)
Two year lead treatment effect
(Repeated funding)
One year lag treatment effect
(Repeated funding)
Two year lag treatment effect (Repeated funding)
Yes
Controls
Yes
Year Fixed Effect
Yes
State Fixed Effect
Observations
18,538
Number of Facilities
2,411
Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.

0.068
-0.056
-0.144**
-0.058
-0.0201
-0.057
0.0223
-0.049
-0.147***
-0.05
Yes
Yes
Yes
18,977
2,542

0.05
(0.06)
-0.175***
(0.06)
-0.0309
(0.06)
0.0304
(0.05)
-0.135***
(0.0504)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

6,342
822

13,793
1,864

I report the results of the formal parallel trend analyses in Table 2.4. The insignificance of lead
indicators in most models (with and without matching) indicates that the difference in treatment and
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control group’s violations in the base year (one year before receiving support) is not significantly different from other pre-funding years. This suggests that the difference in violations over time between
funded and unfunded facilities does not change prior to funding. I have one exception in model 1
(2014 to 2016 treatment), where the pre-funding violation differences 4 and 3 years before receiving
support are significantly greater than the difference in the base year. However, the matched results
(models 3 and 4) show no significant differences. Hence, the unfunded groups represent a reasonable
benchmark counterfactual for the funded groups in terms of the trends in CWA violations pre-treatment.
2.5.3.2. Binary funding treatment
I report the results from the multiple-period DiD models to examine the effects of binary
funding (Table 2.5) and award sizes (Table 2.6) on non-compliance in the post-funding years. Funded
groups in models 1, 2, 5 and 6 (Tables 2.5 and 2.6) include facilities funded only once between 2014
and 2016. In models 3, 4, 7 and 8, some facilities receive CWSRF support more than once between
2012-2016. These models separate treatment facilities into one-time and repeatedly funded groups.
Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 have more facilities than models 1, 2, 5 and 6 because the latter models
exclude facilities that received support in 2012 and 2013, which are the pre-treatment years in these
models. Neither treatment nor the control facilities can receive support in the pre-treatment years in
the DiD approach. Observations for treatment facilities in treatment years are not included in any of
the models because relative timing of violations versus awards could not be established within the
treatment years. However, all observations from the control group are included in the regressions.
The 2014-2016 treatment year analyses (models 1 and 2 in Table 5) show negative effects of
receiving a one-time CWSRF support on non-compliance of the funded facilities in the subsequent
two years. Estimates in models 3 and 4 with the extended treatment period of 2012-2016 suggest that
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receiving a one-time CWSRF support helps the funded facilities reduce violations two years after receiving the awards relative to the unfunded facilities. Model 4 also suggests that multi-funded facilities
decrease their violations two years after receiving their last award. However, model 3 indicates that
violations increase one year after receiving the last CWSRF award. This may be due to the magnitude
of projects associated with repeated funding, which may take longer to complete, producing more
violations in the meantime. This effect is not statistically significant in our preferred model 4, which
includes facility and county covariates.
Table 2.5. Post-funding violations and CWSRF loan provision
Unmatched

Matched

Treatment Years
2014-2016
Model 1
Model 2

Treatment Years
2012-2016
Model 3
Model 4

Funded Once
Lag1

-0.284***
(0.0698)

-0.347***
(0.0740)

Funded Once
Lag2

-0.227***
(0.0711)

-0.275***
(0.0727)

0.031
-0.0473
-0.201***
-0.0505

0.0716
-0.0499
-0.142***
-0.0521

0.0864**
-0.0436
-0.0286
-0.045

0.0299
-0.0441
-0.139***
-0.045
0.0118***
-0.000317
-0.00349***
-0.001

Repeated Fund
lag1
Repeated Fund
Lag2
Lag Mean Violation

0.0120***
(0.000323)
0.0531***
(0.00312)

Initial Violation

Yes
Yes
20,790

-0.00345***
(0.00102)
6.83e-06
(1.22e-05)
7.14e-07
(2.60e-06)
1.04e-05***
(1.53e-06)
-2.14e-05***
(2.83e-06)
Yes
Yes
18,538

2,759

2,411

Lag Inspection
Mean Water
Flow
Water Flow
Income
Mean Income
Year FE
State FE
Observations
No. of Facilities

Treatment Years
2014-2016
Model 5
Model 6
-0.286
(0.184)
-0.240
(0.253)

-0.0054***
-0.001
5.49E-07
-1.14E-05

-0.344
(0.177)
-0.308**
(0.198)

0.0257
(0.0474)

0.0628
(0.0500)

-0.202***
(0.0506)

-0.139***
(0.0523)

0.0914**
(0.0438)
-0.0175
(0.0452)
0.0143***
(0.00246)
0.0472***
(0.00829)

0.0420
(0.0443)
-0.123***
(0.0452)
0.0116***
-0.000368
0.0516***
-0.00343

Yes
Yes
15,325

-0.00387
(0.00108)
-3.20e-05**
(1.27e-05)
5.71e-06**
(2.86e-06)
5.84e-06***
(1.62e-06)
-1.46e-05**
(6.72e-06)
Yes
Yes
13,793

2,080

1,864

Yes
Yes
21,222

9.15e-06***
-1.50E-06
-2.02e-05***
-2.79E-06
Yes
Yes
18,977

Yes
Yes
7,001

-0.00884**
(0.00449)
2.36e-05
(1.47e-05)
-1.99e-05**
(1.01e-05)
-1.88e-07
(7.41e-06)
-1.01e-05
(7.98e-06)
Yes
Yes
6,342

2,891

2,542

895

822

1.65E-06
-2.48E-06

Treatment Years
2012-2016
Model 7
Model 8
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Overall, Table 2.5 shows that the loans provided in 2012-2016 had the intended effect of
reducing non-compliance. Post-funding violations decline two years after receiving support. Models
1 and 2 also suggest that facilities funded only once between 2014 to 2016 experienced a reduction in
violations one year after receiving the loans. On the other hand, facilities that receive multiple loans
may be pursuing larger projects, which take longer to complete and improve compliance. As a result,
one-year lagged violations are statistically insignificant, while two-year lagged violations show a decrease relative to the unfunded facilities. These results are consistent with the matched sample regression results in models 5-8 in terms of signs and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients.
Table 2.5 shows that violations in the previous three years have a significant and positive coefficient. This suggests that NPDES violations are persistent as the facilities with more violations
before receiving CWSRF continue to experience more violations in later years. The size of the facility
(water flow) does not appear to correlate with non-compliance. Per capita income in the county where
the facility is located is positively correlated with reported violations. One reason for this result may
be that facilities in wealthier counties may follow more rigorous reporting practices than those in
poorer counties. In such cases, facilities in wealthier counties may show more violations. Regulatory
actions in terms of the number of lag inspection actions also help reduce non-compliance6.
2.5.3.3. Continuous funding treatment
Table 2.6, structured similarly to Table 2.5, reports the effect of award size on post-funding
compliance. Interaction terms between binary funding variables and the corresponding CWSRF award
size show the effects of award size on the number of violations. The results show that the size of one-

Funding may come with regulatory activities like inspection and enforcement, which in turn may influence compliance.
To consider this line of reasoning following reviewer’s suggestion, I examined whether funding triggers additional inspection or enforcement actions. Using the techniques similar to equations 5 and 6, I found no evidence of increased
inspection or enforcement after funding. This results is available upon request. I thank the reviewer for the suggestion.
6
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Table 2.6. Post-funding violations and magnitudes of CWSRF awards
Unmatched
Treatment Years
2014-2016

Matched

Treatment Years
2012-2016

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Funded Once
Lag1*Award
Magnitude

-1.20E-08

-1.30E-08

4.92E-09

6.92E-09

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Funded Once
Lag2*Award
Magnitude

-1.60e-08*

-1.51E-08

(0.00)

(0.00)

-3.03e08***
(0.00)

-2.48e-08***
(0.00)

Treatment Years
2014-2016
Model
Model 6
5
-2.04E-2.13e-08*
08
(0.00)
(0.00)
-2.40E08
(0.00)

-2.32E-08
(0.00)

Treatment Years
2012-2016
Model 7

Model 8

4.68E-09

6.51E-09

(0.00)

(0.00)

-3.03e08***
(0.00)

-2.47e-08***
(0.00)

Repeated
Award
lag1*Cumulative AwardMagnitude

-1.57E-10
(0.00)

-1.70E-10
(0.00)

-1.33E-10
(0.00)

-1.53E-10
(0.00)

Repeated
Award Lag2
*Cumulative
Award Magnitude

1.70E-10
(0.00)

1.22E-10
(0.00)

1.79E-10
(0.00)

1.32E-10
(0.00)

Initial Violation

0.0527***
(0.00)

0.0511***
(0.00)

0.0471***
(0.01)

0.0516***
(0.00)

Mean Lag Violation

0.0120***

0.0118***

0.0142***

0.0116***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.00336***

-0.00331***

-0.00874*

-0.00366***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

7.99E-06

3.64E-07

2.35E-05

-3.23e-05**

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

6.04E-07

1.86E-06

-1.97e-05*

5.98e-06**

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

1.04e-05***

9.07e-06***

-1.47E-07

5.77e-06***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-2.01e-05***

-1.01E-05

-1.46e-05***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

Inspection
Lag1
Mean Flow
Water Flow
Per Capita Income

-2.15e05***
(0.00)

Mean Per
Capita Inc
Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

20,790

18,538

21,222

18,977

7,001

6,342

15,325

13,793

2,759

2,411

2,891

2,542

895

822

2,080

1,864

Observations
No. of Facilities

35

time awards does not have a statistically significant effect on violations one year after funding. However, according to models 3, 4, 7, and 8, which account for repeat provision of CWSRF, the larger the
one-time provided loans, the fewer the violations two years after funding. This result suggests that the
one-time award’s magnitude has a lagged effect two years after funding on compliance, which is consistent with the results in Table 2.5. On the other hand, the results in Table 2.6 show no statistical
effect of the size of the repeat awards on non-compliance within two years of receiving the last award.
Repeated loans are likely awarded to facilities with larger projects that may take longer to complete.
Therefore, reduction in non-compliance may take longer than two years. Replacing or updating treatment technologies and operations that improve compliance can take longer than two years after loans
are provided (Keieser and Hapiro, 2019).
I also estimate marginal effects for funding provision and award size. Table A3 in the appendix
shows marginal effects at means corresponding to Poisson regressions results of models 4 from Tables
2.5 and 2.6, respectively. Marginal effect estimates suggest that each one-time award reduces violations
by 0.139, and repeated awards reduce violations by 0.209. It takes, on average, seven one-time loans
(1/0.139) and five (1/0.209) multi-awards to reduce violations of funded facilities by one count within
two years after funding. The effects of CWSRF provision on non-compliance can be compared to
alternative non-compliance interventions. For example, our results show that each inspection reduces
violations by .005. Hence, it takes 200 inspections to reduce violations by one count.
Marginal effect estimates for the effects of award size indicate that a dollar of one-time
CWSRF award decreases violations by 2.61*10-8 per facility two years after funding. This implies that,
on average, it takes a $50 million CWSRF loan to decrease violations by one within two years of award
provision. In our sample, an average one-time grant is $7.6 million. Hence, it takes roughly seven
awards to decrease violations by one. It is important to recognize that our post-funding compliance
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examination is limited to two post-award years. Improvements in compliance from CWSRF investments can take longer than two years (Keiser and Shapiro, 2019). Therefore, limiting the analysis to
only the first two years after funding provision is likely to undervalue the efficacy of CWSRF in improving long-term compliance.
Consistent with the results in Table 2.6, the marginal effect for the magnitude of the repeated
CWSRF award is not statistically significant. Although the provision of multiple awards has a statistically significant and negative effect on violations (Tables 2.5 and A3), the magnitude of the repeated
awards has no statistically significant effect on violations within two years from the last loan provision.
Large repeated CWSRF loans may require multiple years to complete. As a result, the impact of these
awards may not be observed within the first two years after funding. Instead, one may need to look at
longer time periods after funding to detect a change in non-compliance. This is consistent with Keiser
and Shapiro (2019), who document a positive effect of CWA grants on downstream water quality
attributes several years after the grant is provided.

2.6.

Conclusion
Compliance with the Clean Water Act is an important public health and environmental quality

objective. The U.S. has spent over $1 trillion to control water pollution, and the economic efficacy of
these investments remains debated (Keiser and Shapiro, 2019; Keiser et al., 2019). Wastewater treatment facilities are responsible for treating wastewater before it is discharged into public water bodies.
Pursuant to the CWA, all wastewater discharge facilities are issued permits that specify the type and
the amount of the regulated pollutants each facility can discharge. Compliance with discharge permits
depends on operational procedures and on technological infrastructure at the treatment facilities. Adequacy of operational procedures and especially technological infrastructure depends on the availability of finances. Clean Water State Revolving Funds program was set up in 1987 in part to address this
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investment need. This study examines the allocation of CWSRF assistance across wastewater treatment facilities and the impacts of these investments on compliance with the CWA in recent years.
While prior studies examine downstream water quality in terms of dissolved oxygen deficit,
fecal coliform, and organic nitrogen (Earnhart, 2004; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Earnhart and Harrington, 2014; Harrington and Malinovskaya, 2015; Chakraborti, 2016; Keiser and Shapiro, 2019), I
focus on the CWA compliance using cumulative discharge violations of NPDES requirements across
all regulated pollutants. The analysis of cumulative discharge violations of NPDES permits covering
all regulated pollutants enables a broader evaluation of CWSRF loans, which can be used for various
projects aimed at improving discharge water quality with respect to various pollutants. The limitation
of using a cumulative number of violations is that the reporting quality can vary across different pollutants (Harrington and Malinovskaya, 2015), which can mask the effects that may be present for
particular pollutants. The disaggregated analysis of particular pollutants and financial support would
be useful and should be pursued in future studies.
The NPDES violations by wastewater treatment plants in nine states between 2010 and 2018
reveal that funded facilities have poorer compliance records before receiving CWSRF support than
the unfunded facilities. This result is in contrast with Harrington & Malinovskaya (2015), who observe
that financial support is generally not allocated to the facilities in greatest need in terms of compliance.
Our results show a statistically significant difference between funded and unfunded facilities in prefunding compliance. I also document that larger loans are awarded to larger facilities. Since larger
facilities tend to be located in more populated areas, this result is consistent with Keiser and Shapiro
(2019), who observe that larger loans are awarded to facilities located in more populated areas.
I examine the effects of provision and magnitude of financial support on post-award compliance. I find that the CWSRF loans awarded between 2012 and 2016 reduced violations of funded
facilities within two years after funding. This result is consistent with previous literature documenting
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a positive effect of financial support on water quality. Harrington and Malinovskaya (2015) find that
CWSRF loans improve biological oxygen demand and organic nitrogen discharge of treatment plans
in four states. I extend their results by considering the cumulative number of violations rather than
focusing on particular pollutants and by explicitly examining the effects of single versus multiple
awards and the effects of award magnitude. Keiser and Shapiro (2019) use a longer time horizon and
a broader scope of analysis to show that Clean Water Act grants have a statistically significant and
positive effect on downstream water quality several years after the grant is provided and continue to
have a positive effect for many years after. The lagged effect of the grants is expected because some
of the grants support projects that can take multiple years to complete. Our study differs by examining
cumulative NPDES compliance rather than particular water quality attributes and focusing on the
short-term impacts on compliance within the first two years after funding. I find a qualitatively similar
positive effect of CWSRF support even within the first two years post-funding.
I observe some evidence of larger singular CWSRF awards having greater impacts on reducing
non-compliance than smaller awards two years after funding. I also estimate that, on average, a $50
million one-time award decreases non-compliance by one violation two years post-funding. On the
other hand, the cumulative size of repeated CWSRF awards is not statistically significant for reducing
non-compliance within the first two years post-funding. Statistical insignificance of the value of multiple CWSRF awards is likely due to the data limitations. Our data include only two post-treatment
years. Facilities that receive multiple CWSRF awards are likely to be engaged in larger infrastructure
upgrades that take several years to complete after funding is provided. The average size of one-time
awards in our sample is $7.6 million, while the average combined value of repeated awards is $28.7
million. Since projects funded by larger grants may take longer to complete, our results may not capture improvements in compliance that take more than two years to materialize. In this respect, our

39

focus on the first two years of compliance post-funding undervalues the efficacy of CWSRF in improving compliance in the long run. Future examinations that use longer time horizons may detect
longer-term impacts of CWSRF support, similar to Keieser and Shapiro (2019).
It is important to acknowledge that the NPDES permits can be relaxed or tightened over time
in response to changes in the water quality of the receiving watershed (Chakraborti and McConnell,
2012). Hence, changes in compliance records can depend on the availability of adequate investments
and management of the water treatment plants as well as on the changes in the requirements of the
NPDES permits. Since the NPDES permit requirements can change over time, our results should not
be interpreted in terms of the effect of the CWSRF support on water quality in general. Instead, the
results in this study apply strictly to compliance with the CWA in terms of the NPDES violations
rather than to water quality.
Our results are limited by the temporal and spatial scope of the analysis. Although CWSRF
has been in place since 1987, facility level funding data are publicly available only from 2010 and only
for a subsample of states. As a result, I cannot assess the effectiveness of the CWSRF prior to 2010
or generalize the result for the U.S. as a whole. Limited data availability prevents us from evaluating
the long-run effectiveness of CWSRF support. I consider the effects of the CWSRF support on compliance with the CWA for only up to two years following the provision of the loan. It is, however,
possible that improvements in compliance may be observed in the longer run. The lagged effect is
expected as infrastructure improvement projects can take time to complete. Nevertheless, this study
provides important evidence supporting the efficacy of the CWSRF in improving compliance with
CWA even within a couple of years after the provision of financial assistance.
Our results are also subject to the quality of the data used in the analysis. Although all point
sources are required to obtain an NPDES permit under the CWA, not all facility, permit, or discharge
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monitoring data are provided in ICIS-NPDES, and reporting quality differs across states, facilities,
and over time. In this regard, the inconsistency of the NPDES violation reports is a significant caveat.
While this study offers a valuable initial assessment of the CWSRF program’s role in compliance with
the CWA, possible strategic underreporting by wastewater facilities should be considered in the extrapolation and interpretation of our results.

2.7.
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Appendix 2A
Table A2.1. Summary statistics
Mean
AR
(# of grants =17 )

AZ
(# of grants = 4)

CA
(# of grants =112 )

IN
(# of grants =111 )

NE
(# of grants =87)

OK
(# of grants =73 )

TX
(# of grants =109 )

WV
(# of grants =98 )

Other States

Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow [Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility]
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow[ Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility]
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow [Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow [Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility]
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow [Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow[Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow [Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow [Mgal/ Year]
CWSRF Size [106 $ per year per facility
Annual Violations per facility
Daily WaterFlow [Mgal/ Year]

6
374

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

10
2353

0
1

120
69446

32.9

0.35

140

7
115

10
175

0
3

49
741

1.5

1.5

0.035

3.233

2
5820

5
12620

0
50

26
56856

33.5

80

0.5

600

3
2455

7
4793

0
2

45
38261

9.96

18.5

0.227

139

5
971

12
2861

0
2

63
21416

4.09

7

0.1

40

9
1042

10
2044

0
7

46
16190

5.7

7.6

0.2

39.9

4
4572

7
12336

0
10

39
57074

8.3

15

0.2

107

15
371

26
2293

0
2

166
21554

3.4

5.3

0.007

26.5

2.02547
1168

7.15493
16683

0
1

246
1353815

16.9
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Table A2.2. Poisson and logit difference models for pre-funding violations
Pre funding violations
Panel-Poisson
Panel-Logit
VARIABLES
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.486***
0.426***
0.804***
0.682***
Fund t+1
Fund t+2
Fund t+3

(0.0959)
0.427***
(0.0972)
0.462***
(0.0991)

(0.0911)
0.379***
(0.0927)
0.379***
(0.0952)

(0.185)
0.753***
(0.209)
0.909***
(0.241)

(0.182)
0.682***
(0.206)
0.684***
(0.241)

Yes
Yes

-1.65E-06
(2.60E-06)
0.139***
(0.04)
0.008
(0.06)
4.15e-06***
(1.60E-06)
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

9.25E-06
(1.10E-05)
0.139***
(0.039)
0.008
(0.05)
-2.19e-05***
(4.26E-06)
Yes
Yes

22,012
3,059

20,243
3,045

22,012
3,059

20,243
3,045

Water Flow
Rep. Fund t-1
Rep. Fund t-2
Per.C.Income
Year Fixed Effect
State Fixed Effect
Observations
Number of Facilities
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Table A2.3. Marginal effect at means from panel Poisson models 4 in Tables 5 and 6
Variable
Only Fund Lag1

Model 4 (Table 5)
Award

Model 4 (Table 6)
Award size

.0766411
(.05)

Only Fund Lag2

-.139**

Rep. Fund Lag1

.0609

(.05)
(.04)
Rep. Fun Lag2

-.209***
(.05)

Only Fund Lag1* CWSRF Lag1

6.78e-09
(8.53e-09)
-2.61e-08 ***

Only Fund Lag2* CWSRF Lag2

(5.53e-09)
-1.93e-10
(3.86e-09)
-1.16e-10
(3.86e-09)

repeated Lag1* CWSRF Lag1
repeated Lag2* CWSRF Lag2

Year FE

-.005***
(.003)
Yes

-.005***
(0.001)
Yes

State FE

Yes

Yes

17470
2,538
Yes

17470
2,538
Yes

Inspection lag1

Observations
No. of Facilities
Controls
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3. Stated and Revealed Financial Assistance Priorities: Evidence from the
Clean Water State Revolving Fund
3.1.

Introduction
Regional and national government agencies rely on regulatory policies, market-based instru-

ments, and financial assistance programs to improve environmental outcomes from air and water
waste discharges. Financial assistance programs can support adoption of cleaner technologies and
modern operating procedures that improve environmental performance (Hahn and Stavins, 1992;
McHugh, 1985; Hanley et al., 2001). Surprisingly, there is a shortage of studies examining the distribution of scarce public financial resources across eligible environmental protection initiatives and
water quality improvement projects in particular. The distribution of financial support can depend
not only on environmental performance measures but also on socioeconomic and political factors.
In this study, I examine stated and revealed priorities of state agencies in the US for allocating financial assistance to wastewater treatment plants.
In 1972, the U.S introduced the Clean Water Act (CWA) to address point source water pollution. The primary objective of the CWA has been to restore and maintain the chemical, physical
and biological integrity of the nation’s waters (USEPA, 2004). Under the CWA, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) maintains surface water discharge permits for a list of
regulated water pollutants. Each NPDES permit limits the amount of regulated pollutant that a facility may discharge and specifies the monitoring and reporting requirements which form the basis for
enforcement (Gaba, 2007; Helland, 1998a; Chakraborti and McConnell, 2012).
In 1987, as part of the CWA, the Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRFs) program
was established to provide low cost loans to publicly owned treatment works for construction, expansion or maintenance of municipal wastewater treatment systems, or for other projects intended
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to improve local water quality (USEPA, 2010; Travis et al., 2004). The CWSRF program is financed
primarily through federal-state funding partnerships that establish revolving funds to provide belowmarket loans to communities and facilities. CWSRF assistance requires a 20% state match (ASCE,
2021). As loans are repaid into the revolving fund, the funds are re-distributed to subsequent projects. Between 1988 and 2019, the program provided over forty-one thousand low-interest loans for
water quality improvement projects (USEPA, 2020). Majority of the CWSRF loans are allocated to
wastewater treatment facilities and conveyance projects (GAO, 2006).
Since 1972, $104 billion has been spent on CWA related projects. Nevertheless, the EPA estimates that the nation’s wastewater treatment facilities need $271 billion over the next 20 years to
meet the CWA’s water quality objectives (Ramseur, 2018). According to the EPA, CWSRF is inadequate for meeting the water quality goals of the Clean Water Act (USEPA 2016c). In 2019, requests
for CWSRF support exceeded $55 billion while the corresponding Congress’s allocation for the
CWSRF program was less than $2 billion (ASCE, 2021). The need for investment in improved
wastewater treatment infrastructure has been well documented (USEPA, 2000; USEPA, 2016a;
Rahm et al., 2013) and is addressed in the Drinking Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Act of
2021 (117th Congress).
Adequate investment in proper infrastructure for treatment and management of wastewater
discharge is critical for compliance with the NPDES permits and maintenance of adequate water
quality (Ramseur, 2017, Copeland, 2010). Okaru (1994) argues that noncompliance of small systems
with the CWA stems primarily from deficiencies in financing. A significant share of CWSRF assistance is allocated to larger facilities with better credit risk, while smaller facilities are often unable to
obtain necessary financial support. Rahm et al. (2013) analyze financing of wastewater systems and
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find that wastewater treatment plants in some watersheds are more prone to NPDES effluent violations, suggesting the need for investments in facility upgrades.
The scarcity of financial resources implies the need for understanding and evaluating the distribution of available funds across eligible wastewater projects. In this research, we examine how
states prioritize investments in wastewater treatment facilities. Questions to be investigated include:
Is financial assistance directed to the facilities with the greatest need for support? Do facilities with a
higher number of CWA effluent violations receive greater priority? Does observed environmental
quality affect allocation of financial support? Does corruption affect the allocation of scarce funds?
Is there consistency between stated intentions and observed allocations of financial assistance by
state authorities?
I address these questions empirically by taking advantage of the ex-ante Intended Use Plans
(IUPs) and ex post Annual Reports (AR) required by the CWSRF program. Every year, before receiving federal support, states are required to submit applications to the EPA that must include the
IUPs with the list of projects that states intent to fund. After receiving public comments and EPA’s
approval of the IUPs, states finalize the projects and disburse the loans subject to the availability of
funding. The AR published by the state environmental protection agencies identify the actual disbursements, which often differ from stated intentions. Some of the facilities included in the IUP do
not receive CWSRF support, while others are funded without being included in the IUP. I rely on
the state ARs and IUPs to examine the distribution of CWSRF assistance and compare stated versus
revealed funding priorities. Stated priorities correspond to the IUPs with projects that the authorities
intend to fund, while revealed priorities are observed from annual reports of actual CWSRF disbursements.
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According to the EPA’s guidelines, states should use the Integrated Planning and Priority
Setting System to provide CWSRF assistance for water quality improvement projects(USEPA, 2001).
This prioritization framework can be based on an integrated ranking system or a goal-based approach. A state may either use one of these suggested methods or develop its own approach. In
some integrated ranking systems, a share of the available budget is reserved for highest priority water
quality needs. Under goal-based approach states identify specific watershed-based goals like nutrient
reduction, habitat protection, or wetland restoration. Most states utilize integrated ranking system,
while Massachusetts (MassDEP, 2019), New Hampshire and Florida have partially adopted a goalbased approach (Rahm et al., 2013). The objective of the Integrated Priority Setting System is to ensure consistency in CWSRF distribution and provision of resources for high priority water quality
improvement projects.
States allocate CWSRF assistance according to their individual water quality needs and other
priorities (Dijkstra and Fredriksson, 2010; Travis et al., 2004). While prioritization mechanisms can
vary widely across states, facility funding decisions generally depend on water quality benefits, compliance with state and federal regulations, and community financial needs (USEPA, 2001; Travis et
al., 2004). Although in most cases, water quality related objectives are the primary criteria for distributing financial assistance, states can also consider provisions related to financial and environmental
sustainability of infrastructure and the needs of disadvantaged communities (USEPA, 2012). Some
states explicitly prioritize restoration and preservation of chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the state's waters by focusing on prevention of pollutant discharge (TWDB, 2019). States can also
consider the readiness of the facilities to proceed with the proposed projects as part of the efforts to
ensure that the CWSRF funds are utilized effectively.
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Corruption often causes distortion in public policy (Mauro, 1998; Polinsky and Shavell,
2001; Hindriksetal, 1999). In the United States, environmental policy is often mandated at the federal level but implemented primarily at the state level. Many federal environmental policies, such as
the CWA, suffer from failures in execution at the state level. Other literature on the CWA has documented inconsistent state oversight due to state characteristics such as corruption leading to heterogeneity in enforcement of the CWA (Flatt, 1997; Grooms, 2015). Grooms (2015) provides empirical
evidence on the effect of state-level corruption on compliance with the CWA.
Our work adds to the water quality literature with an analysis of factors associated with allocation of CWSRF to wastewater treatment plants. I examine financial support allocation from
CWSRF in terms of treatment plants’ CWA violations, watershed’s quality, and socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding communities. A limited number of studies have examined the distribution of financial assistance to water treatment facilities (Harrington & Malinovskaya, 2015; Travis et
al. 2004; Bunch, 2008). I use the data on wastewater treatment plants’ annual violations of NPDES
permit requirements, corresponding watershed impairment data, enforcement and inspections records, county income, demographics, and state level corruption, to shed light on the states’ intended
and revealed priorities in awarding CWSRF assistance. In addition to examining the aggregate number of violations of all regulated pollutants, I also examine the violations of individual pollutants including biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and suspended solids (SS). Our study focuses on BOD
and SS as these pollutants are commonly targeted by the EPA’s pollution control efforts (Earnhart
and Harrington, 2014). To my best knowledge, this is the first empirical work to evaluate CWSRF
allocation to wastewater treatment facilities in terms of a) consistency between stated intentions and
observed funding decisions, b) receiving-stream’s water quality and effluent limit violations, and c)
socioeconomic indicators including corruption.
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Examining stated and revealed funding priorities in selecting projects to be funded is important for CWSRF program assessment (USEPA, 2001). I find that states consistently provide
CWSRF assistance to larger wastewater treatment plants and to facilities with greater number of
NPDES violations in previous years. Non-compliance with the CWA has a positive effect on the
probability of a facility being included in the list of intended recipients and on the probability of receiving CWSRF assistance. However, non-compliance has no effect on the size of planned or
awarded financial assistance. Facilities located in impaired watersheds are more likely to receive financial support, which is consistent with watershed goals-based CWSRF distribution as suggested by
the EPA (USEPA, 2012). However, such prioritization is not apparent in the planning stage. I also
find that facilities in more corrupted states are less likely to receive CWSRF loans and receive smaller
awards. In addition, facilities in richer counties of more corrupt states are more likely to receive
CWSRF loans and the awards are greater than the corresponding facilities in richer counties of less
corrupted states. The magnitude of the received CWSRF support is mostly correlated with the size
of the facility, watershed impairment, inspection actions and on the permit limits of specific effluents (BOD and SS).
Possibly due to budget constraints, some IUP listed facilities do not receive financial assistance. However, I observe that the lists of funded facilities often include treatment plants that are
not identified in the proposed IUPs. Hence, budget constraints may only be a partial reason for the
discrepancies between IUPs and ARs. The results show that conditional on being included in the
IUP list, the facilities discharging into impaired watersheds are more likely to be funded than the facilities not discharging into impaired streams. Regulators are also more likely to follow their stated
funding intentions for frequently inspected facilities. On the other hand, I find that the facilities in
poorer counties are more likely to be funded than ones in richer counties even when they are not
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included in IUP. Perhaps facilities in poorer counties are funded more often even without being included in the initial planning list because these facilities are prioritized based on community development needs and are treated more leniently relative to facilities in richer counties in terms of procedural requirements for CWSRF loans.

3.2.

Related Literature
The effectiveness of CWA grants for improving water quality has been documented in previ-

ous literature. Keiser and Shapiro (2019) find that on average each Clean Water Act grant to municipal
wastewater treatment plants decreases downstream dissolved oxygen deficit and the probability that
downstream waters are not fishable or swimmable. Using the Clean Watersheds Needs Survey
(CWNS), Clean Water Benefits Reporting System (CBR) and Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR)
data, Harrington and Malinovskaya (2015) examine the difference in pollution between funded and
unfunded water treatment plants. Their findings show ex post improvement in performance of funded
facilities in terms of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and organic nitrogen levels compared to
plants that did not receive financial support.
States can follow different priorities for allocating CWSRF assistance including replacement
and maintenance of wastewater infrastructure, size and needs of impacted communities, and federal
and state water quality standards for temperature, nutrients, and sediments (GAO 2006). Some states
allocate CWSRF resources based upon identified water quality needs, while other states place greater
weight on small or economically disadvantaged communities to develop needed wastewater infrastructure. Jocoy (2000) indicates that small water systems do not receive as much financial support as large
water systems in Pennsylvania. Mullin and Daley (2018) analyze federal investment in CWSRF programs and find that the CWSRF loans stimulate additional local investment in wastewater infrastructure. They also show that wastewater spending is positively affected by population and manufacturing
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activity. Heterogeneity across states has also been documented in terms of leveraging CWSRF depending on environmental needs and community demand for assistance (Travis et al. 2004).7
The EPA recommends distributing CWSRF based on waterbody value8, the impairment of or
threats to the waterbody, and the effectiveness of the proposed projects (USEPA 2012). Prior literature provides mixed evidence on how water quality needs influence regulator’s decisions. Newmark
and Witko (2007) find that water pollution severity is not a significant determinant of state water
quality expenditures. Earnhart (2004a) finds no significant effect of ambient water quality on regulator’s inspection decisions. Chakraborti and McConnell (2012) find that effluent permit limits depend
on downstream ambient water quality. Building on this literature, I explore the effect of receivingstream’s water quality on state regulators’ decisions pertaining to CWSRF distribution across
wastewater treatment plants.
Previous studies have examined the effects of inspection and enforcement on compliance with
CWA (Magat and Viscusi 1990; Earnhart 2004; Shimshack and Ward 2005; Gray and Shimshack 2011).
State access to federal funding is contingent on provision of accurate and complete compliance information, which supports more reliable reporting and enforcement activities (Rechtschaffen, 2003).
However, popular press, government reports, and the law and economics literature document inconsistencies in CWA enforcement (Duhigg 2009; Sigman 2005; Flatt 1997). In the US pulp and paper
industry, an increase in inspection increases firms’ compliance with water quality regulations (Magat
and Viscusi, 1990; Shimshack and Ward, 2005). Sanctions, and especially federal fines, improve environmental performance of wastewater treatment plants. However, non-monetary sanctions including
formal administrative orders, formal notices of non-compliance, and administrative consent orders,

Leveraging is a mechanism to invest a part of annual federal/state capitalization to guarantee the municipal bonds and
create additional loans.
8 Waterbody’s value is determined in terms of its proximity to population centers, public access, and use including drinking, swimming, fishing etc. (Adler and Smolen, 1989).
7
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have no effect on compliance (Shimshack and Ward, 2005). Focusing on pulp and paper industry,
Helland (1998b) shows that environmental groups influence state-level regulatory inspections and violations.
Grooms (2015) provides the only analysis of the role of corruption9 in CWA compliance. She
finds that NPDES permit violations fall in corrupt states when they take control of the NPDES permit
program. However, there is a rich literature on the role of corruption in public sector resource allocation. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) discuss the effect of corruption on public expenditures and investments. Corruption demands secrecy and enables shifts of public investment away from projects like
education and health, into defense related projects. Delavallade (2006) uses data from 64 countries
between 1996 and 2001 to show that corruption reduces the share of social expenditures in education,
health, and social protection. On the other hand, corruption increases the share of government spending on energy, culture, housing, and defense. Liu and Mikesell (2014) show that corruption increases
state spending. They find that corruption distorts states’ public resource allocations in favor of influential sectors. Mauro (1998) finds that the share of expenditures on education and health are lower in
more corrupt countries, while overall government expenditure is unaffected.
Under the EPA’s watershed goal criteria, receiving-stream’s water quality should be considered
in approving discharge limits (Chakraborti & McConnell, 2012; USEPA 2007). Less restrictive
NPDES permit limits allow greater discharge of pollutants, which can negatively affect watershed
quality. Accordingly, Earnhart (2004b) notes that permit limits are sometimes adjusted according to
ambient water quality. In high-quality waters, permit limits can be relaxed based on considerations of
economic benefits. Using panel data from Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania, Chakraborti &

Corruption is measured by the number of federal, state, and local public officials in each state/ year convicted in federal court of a corruption related crime. States are classified as corrupt or non-corrupt based on whether their average
corruption within a state across years is above or below the median corruption across states.
9
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McConnell (2012) show that NPDES permits are relaxed with water quality improvements and tightened when water quality declines. However, permit limits may not be lowered to a level that would
interfere with existing or designated uses of the discharge receiving streams.

3.3.

Estimation Method
I employ Heckman sample selection and probit regression models to examine the distribution

of CWSRF loans across wastewater treatment facilities (Brounen & Kok, 2011; Travis et al., 2004;
Saha & Byrne, 1997; Plümper et al. 2006; Seshamani & Gray, 2004). The Heckman sample selection
model is used to examine the inclusion in IUP/AR lists and corresponding magnitudes. A probit
model is used to examine the binary outcomes for the inclusion of individual facilities in IUPs and
ARs.
The Heckman model is used to examine the likelihood and magnitude of support documented
in IUP and AR in two stages. The first stage represents inclusion of a facility in IUP (AR) in a given
year, while the second stage represents the magnitude of support documented in IUP (AR) conditional
on the first stage inclusion. Selection bias occurs when certain facilities are systematically included in
the second stage based on the first stage selection process. This can lead to biased and inconsistent
estimates in the second stage because the analysis is based on a censored sample. Heckman two-step
selection model is a standard approach in these types of circumstances (Little & Rubin, 2019; Becker
et al.2013; Brounen, & Kok, 2011). For those facilities that are included in the IUP (AR), the second
stage shows the dollar amount of intended (provided) support. In the first stage, a probit model with
state and year controls is used to examine whether facilities appear in the IUP (AR).
Pr(𝐶𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1) = Φ(∑𝛾𝑆 𝑄𝑠 + ∑𝑎𝑡 𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋 ′ µ + 𝛽3 V𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4 G𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 )

(3.1)
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where 𝐶𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈{0,1}, Φ(·) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑡
represents average number of annual violations by facility i in state s during the three years prior to
period t. 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the receiving stream is impaired, zero
otherwise. X is a vector of facility, county and state controls. R is a binary indicator which is 1 if the
facility received funding at some point before t. 𝑄𝑠 and 𝑌𝑡 are state and year controls10. G is a binary
variable that is 1 when the observation is for facility that was included in last year’s IUP but didn’t
receive CWSRF support. This variable accounts for situations where a facility may not have received
the intended loan because of lack of funding or insufficient paperwork but was chosen for funding in
the subsequent year.
In the second stage, a linear specification with facility controls is used to examine the magnitude of intended and provided assistance as follows:
𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡 = ∑𝛾𝑖 𝑄𝑖 + ∑𝑎𝑡 𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 ƛ + 𝛽7 𝐺𝑖𝑠𝑡 + µ𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(3.2)

where, 𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the magnitude of the loan awarded to facility i in state s and period t. 𝑄𝑖 is the takes care
of the facility controls. The inverse of Mills ratio, ƛ, is obtained from the first stage probit model. All
regressors from the first part are used in the second stage regression except for repeated funding
dummy R11.
Next using logit regressions, we examine the factors that are associated with facilities not being
funded despite being included in the IUPs.

The use of the facility fixed effect drops all observation for facilities that never received CWSRF assistance between
2010 and 2019 because fixed effect models rely on within group variability. The disadvantage of this approach is that it
only examines funding decisions of facilities that were in the IUP or AR at least once. These results are provided for reference in the appendix tables A1 and A2 IUP and AR respectively.
11 I also estimated Heckman models with the repeated funding dummy in both stages. This variable is insignificant in the
second stage in all estimations.
10
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Pr(𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1) = Φ(∑𝛾𝑆 𝑄𝑠 + ∑𝑎𝑡 𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑊𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋 ′ µ + 𝛽3 V𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4 G𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 )

(3.3)

The binary dependent variable represents one for inclusion of a facility in both IUP and AR in a given
year, and zero if the facility appears only in the IUP. Equation 3.3 includes the same regressors that
are used in equation 3.1.
Equation 3.3 is also used to analyze the factors that are associated with facilities being funded
with versus without being included in the IUP documents. The binary dependent variable represents
one for facilities that are funded and included in the IUP and zero if a facility is funded but not
included in the IUP.

Data
Our objective is to examine the roles of NPDES permit violations, discharge receiving
stream’s quality, and other factors on the likelihood and magnitude of intended and realized CWSRF
assistance allocated to wastewater treatment plants. I use the 2010-2019 CWSRF program data from
nine states including Arkansas, Arizona, California, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Texas and West Virginia with observations from 2,854 unique wastewater treatment plants12. Using
state ARs and IUPs I identify the facilities that are listed as intended and/or observed recipients of
CWSRF assistance. ARs provide the lists of funded facilities while IUPs identify plants that states
included in their ex ante list of proposed recipient facilities.
I use violation counts in preceding three years and a watershed impairment indicator to examine the effect of compliance and watershed quality on CWSRF allotment. I use EPA data for facility
inspections, violations, and enforcement actions. These data are housed in the Integrated Compliance
Information System, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (ICIS-NPDES) and include

I have an unbalanced panel data as some of the observation on funding, wastewater discharge and inspection are missing.
12
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violations of the NPDES permit effluent limits. I use the aggregate number of violations across all
regulated pollutants13 as well as violations of specific pollutants including BOD and SS. This dataset
also includes individual pollutant’s average daily permit limit and pollutant discharge in excess of permitted quantity. I use the exceedance of BOD and SS over the respective permit limits to evaluate the
effect of pollutant specific violations.14 The impairment status of the water body is also reported in
this database15. Following section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, the states identify impaired watersheds in terms of concentrations of one or more pollutants. A body of water is considered impaired
if it fails to meet one or more water quality criteria. Hence in our analysis impairment is represented
with a binary variable which is 1 if the waterbody is identified as impaired.
County data for per capita income are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The corruption data are obtained from the “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of
the Public Integrity Section,” or the PIN (US Department of Justice, 2002). This dataset contains the
number of federal, state, and local public officials in each state/ year convicted in federal court of a
corruption related crime. These data were used in Grooms (2015), Goel and Nelson (1998), Glaeser
and Saks (2006) and Leeson and Sobel (2008). The PIN data provide a state level measure of corruption which varies both over time and across states.

List of violation categories in the exceedance reports includes: Nitrogen, Phosphorus, Organic enrichment, Solids,
Metals, TRI (EPS’s Toxics Release Inventory) chemicals, Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), temperature, general radioactivity, pathogen indicators, and others.
13

EPA’s Storage and Retrieval (STORET) data warehouse, and US Geological Survey (USGS) National Water Information System (NWIS) provide data on watershed BOD and SS. However, due to excessive number of missing observations, the watershed impairment in terms of BOD or SS could not be included in pollutant specific analysis.
14

Watershed impairment is determined based on the water quality criteria which are limits on particular chemicals or
conditions in a water body. Elements of State/Tribal water quality criteria protect designated uses of the watersheds,
such as propagation of fish and wildlife, recreation, and public water supply. If monitoring and assessment indicate that
for some uses and/or parameters, a waterbody or segment is not meeting water quality standard, then that water is considered "impaired”. See https://cfpub.epa.gov/watertrain/moduleFrame.cfm?parent_object_id=2059
15
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Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the facilities and loans on our dataset. The table
is structured based on the facilities being included or excluded from the IUP lists (In IUP versus and
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics based on AR\ IUP from 2011-2019

Variable

Not in
IUP
(N =
12,525)

In IUP
(N =
591)

Awarded CWSRF ($ million)
Intended CWSRF ($ million)
Average yearly facility violations in last three years
Average annual facility BOD discharge exceedance (kg/Yr)
Average annual facility SS discharge exceedance (kg/Yr)
Impaired watershed (yes=1)
Facility Permit BOD limit (kg/day)
Facility Permit suspended solid limit(kg/day)
Water Flow [Mgal/ Year]
Annual Number of Inspections
Annual Number of Enforcement Actions
County Per Capita Personal Income ($ 1,000)
County proportion of African American
State corruption per capita

In AR
(N = 305)
Mean
Std. Dev.
N=111
14
0
8
452.95
1510.38
0.42
810.86
1082.99
2344.54
4
0.23
41
0.07
0.001

53
0
11
1688.78
7572.37
0.49
2422.89
2901.50
7333.63
5
0.87
8
0.07
0.004

Not in AR
(N = 12,811)
Mean
Std. Dev.
N=12,414
0
0
0
0
6
10
2167.68
154572.9
23419.87
1652245
0.39
0.48
160.11
1212.89
222.72
1179.72
584.80
2859.15
3
4
0.13
0.45
42
9
0.07
0.07
0.001
0.005

Repeated Funding Dummy

.30

.46

.05

.23

Last year IUP Dummy

.08

.27

.02

.14

Awarded CWSRF ($ million)
Intended CWSRF ($ million)
Average yearly violation per facility for last three years
Average annual facility BOD discharge exceedance (kg/Yr)
Average annual facility SS discharge exceedance (kg/Yr)
Impaired
Permit limit of BOD per facility (kg/day)
Permit limit of Suspended Solid per facility (kg/day)
Water Flow [Mgal/ Year]
Annual Number of Inspections
Annual Number of Enforcement Actions
County Per Capita Personal Income ($ 1,000)
County proportion of African American
State corruption per capita

N=194
17
37
8
172.31
1263.91
0.64
1195.50
1515.59
3277.85
5
0.21
45
0.05
0.0004

50
124
12
796.44
8181.35
0.47
3062.14
3311.08
8545.10
5
0.56
12
0.06
0.001

N=397
0
0
14
57
7
9
460.88
5950.91
1124.39
7683.23
0.38
0.48
359.85
1116.83
476.84
1548.27
1611.08
6082.32
4
4
0.27
0.71
44
11
0.07
0.07
0.001
0.003

Repeated Funding Dummy

.42

.49

.19

.39

Last year IUP Dummy

.10

.30

.15

.36
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Not in IUP) and based on the facilities being funded or not (In AR versus Not in AR). Cumulatively,
591 facility loans are listed in the IUPs. Only 305 loans have been identified as awarded in the ARs.
Some of the intended loans in the IUP may not be awarded due to budgetary constraints. However,
I also observe that 111 of the awarded loans in the ARs are not included in the corresponding IUPs.
Hence, some facilities receive support even when they are not present in the list of planned recipients.
Therefore, the discrepancy between IUP and AR lists is not solely due to budget constraints.
The average size of an intended loan that ends up not being awarded is $37 million, while an
average size of intended loan that is awarded is $14 million. Similarly, an average size of an awarded
loan received by a facility that was included in the list of intended recipients is $17 million, while the
average size of a loan awarded to a facility that was not included in the corresponding year IUP is $1.4
million. On average, a funded facility is more likely to be discharging into an impaired watershed.
Approximately 70% of loans that are included in both IUP and AR correspond to facilities that discharge into impaired waterbodies. This share is significantly lower for facilities that are either included
in IUP but not in AR, in AR but not in IUP, or neither in IUP nor AR. Average BOD and SS permit
discharge limits are significantly greater for funded (intended to be funded) than for unfunded (not
intended to be funded) facilities. As funded facilities have less stringent permits, the respective watersheds are more likely to be impaired. I also observe that on average, funded (intended to be funded)
facilities are larger in terms of water flow compared to the unfunded (not intended to be funded)
facilities.
We also have two additional binary variables to represent whether a facility was funded in
previous years and if a facility was intended to be funded in the previous year but did not receive
support. I add this variable to our models because 23% of funded facilities in our sample receive
support more than once. In some cases, financial support may be split across multiple years rather
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than provided in a lump sum. Facilities may be included in IUP but not receive the CWSRF support
because of budget shortfalls, incomplete paperwork, not being ready to utilize the funds for the proposed projects or other reasons, which can delay funding. Such facilities may be prioritized for inclusion in IUP lists in subsequent years.
Per-capita income, share of African American population and state level corruption capture
the socioeconomic factors that may influence funding decisions. The average county per capita income
is higher in the counties with the intended recipient facilities than the counties without. However, I
do not observe such difference based on actual funding outcomes. Proportion of African American
population is significantly higher in the counties with facilities that are intended recipients of CWSRF
support and receive support relative to the counties where facilities are not funded and counties where
facilities are funded but are not included in the IUP list. I also observe that facilities which are included
in the IUPs and in ARs are located in states where on average four out of ten thousand people are
convicted of corruption charges. On the other hand, facilities that are not included in IUPs and/or
ARs are in states where one in a thousand are convicted of corruption. Hence, corruption is less
prevalent in states where there is greater consistency between IUP and AR lists.

3.4.

Results
I present the results in three subsections: (i) ex ante stated priorities for CWSRF allocation

based on the IUP lists, (ii) ex post revealed priorities for CWSRF allocation based on AR lists, and (iii)
contrast between stated and revealed priorities combining the IUP and AR lists. In each subsection,
I present results from three models. Model 1 presents the results for the analysis of funding decisions
in terms of aggregate number of violations across all pollutants. Models 2 and 3 focus on the effects
of BOD and SS violations, respectively. The latter two models enable the inclusion the extent of

66

violations for the respective pollutant instead of the count of violations. In these models I use average
annual BOD and SS exceedances over the permit limits as controls.
3.5.1

Stated priorities in the intended use plans
Table 3.2 shows the Heckman model results for the state funding intentions according to the

IUP lists. Each of the three presented models shows the first stage results for the probability of receiving the CWRF support and second stage results for the magnitude of the award.
Model 1 shows that the average number of annual NPDES permit violations in the previous
three years has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of funding intent. Greater likelihood
of the intent to fund facilities with more NPDES violations is consistent with the EPA’s guidelines
and the states’ efforts to improve compliance with the Clean Water Act (IFA 2019, USEPA 2001,
VDEC, 2019). While the probability of a facility being included in the list of intended CWSRF recipients depends on NPDES violations, the magnitude of the intended award is not associated with noncompliance. Models 2 and 3 show that neither the likelihood nor the magnitude of intended support
depend on the BOD or SS specific violations individually.
States can improve the efficiency of CWSRF funds by conditioning the distribution of support
in part on the current waterbody impairment, the value of impacted waterbodies, and the potential
effects of financial assistance on waterbody impairment (USEPA, 2001; Rahm et al. 2013). Few states
have adopted such watershed quality goal-based approach to water quality management, prioritizing
restoration of degraded watersheds (Rahm et al. 2013). In some cases, wastewater treatment plants are
the largest contributors to water quality impairment (NACWA, 2009). However, I find no evidence
of watershed goal-based approach being followed in the stated intentions for allocation of CWSRF.
Receiving stream’s impairment is not a significant determinant of the likelihood that a facility is in-
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cluded in the list of intended CWSRF recipients. Model 1 shows a negative association between watershed impairment and the size of the intended loan, which implies that smaller loans are intended
for the facilities discharging into impaired watersheds.
Stringencies of a facility’s BOD (model 2) and SS (model 3) permit limits do not affect the
likelihood of being the intended recipient of the award. However, conditional on being included in
the IUP, BOD and SS permit limits are positively associated with the magnitude of intended support.
Larger CWSRF loans are intended for the facilities with less stringent BOD and SS permits. In practice, NPDES permit limits can be relaxed with water quality improvements or tightened when water
quality declines (Chakraborti and McConnell, 2012).16 However, in some cases, regulators may not be
able to increase the stringency of the effluent limits to improve water quality outcomes if compliance
with stricter permits may be too costly or if political support for stricter regulation may be weak
(McConnell and Schwarz, 1992). When tightening less stringent NPDES permits may be politically
difficult or impractical due to costs of compliance, the regulators can provide financial assistance in
support of efforts to improve wastewater discharge of facilities with less stringent permits. Financial
support can be used to facilitate adoption of new technologies and processes when permit limits cannot be used as a pollution control tool. Our results show that conditional on being the intended
recipient of the CWSRF support, the facilities with less stringent BOD and SS permit limits are the
intended recipients of larger support.
I find that facility size, in terms of waterflow volume has a significant effect on the regulators’
stated priorities for allocating CWSRF assistance. Our results suggest that small wastewater systems
are less likely to be the intended recipients of financial support then their large counterparts. This

This could potentially introduce an endogeneity bias. However, in our data I observe negligible variation in BOD and
SS permit limits over time. Approximately 97% of the facilities do not experience a change in their permit limits within
our study period.
16
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Table 3.2. Determinants of likelihood and magnitude of planned CWSRF support
Model 1
Model 2
VARIABLES
(All pollutants)
(BOD)
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
0.00787***
.417884
Avg NPDES Violn for
(0.00224)
(.386005)
last 3 years
Avgload of BOD over
-1.20e-06
-.0001024
limit in last 3 years
(2.48e-06)
(.0003169)
AvgLoad of SS over
limit inlast 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

0.0656
(0.0473)

-30.93**
(14.92)

Avg. daily Permit limit
of BOD in last 3 Years

0.0749
(0.0495)

-33.44*
(17.31)

4.37e-07
(1.18e-05)

.0117***
(.002)

Avg. daily Permit limit
of SS in last 3 Years

Selection
Estimation

Model 3
(SS)

Level
Estimation

-1.21e-06
(2.93e-06)

.0005
(.0005)

0.0660
(0.0497)

-19.78
(15.92)

1.43e-05
(1.42e-05)

.00007***
(.006)

1.79e-05***
(4.29e-06)

-.001257*
(.0007)

2.09e-05***
(5.46e-06)

-.000681
(.000693)

1.75e-05***
(5.97e-06)

-.000446
(.00066)

Inspection lag1

0.0102*
(0.00570)

1.129*
(.593423)

0.00886
(0.00596)

.805026
(.599624)

0.0102*
(0.00601)

.232762
(.579049)

Enforcement lag1

0.0991***
(0.0382)

-3.184
(3.329)

0.126***
(0.0384)

-1.551
(3.287)

0.125***
(0.0385)

2.154
(3.183)

Per Capita
Income

-.0158***
(.0015)

-.992***
(.307)

-.015***
(.0017)

-.721**
(.300)

-.015***
(.0017)

-1.00***
(.289)

Corruption

-54.55**
(27.25)

-5783.34
(4398.4)

-49.95*
(27.21)

-3696.9
(4267.5)

-50.30*
(27.01)

-4931.2
(3962.8)

1.10**
(.535)

165.8
(113.3)

1.00*
(0.538)

112.4
(110.3)

1.01*
(0.534)

136.5
(101.7)

Prop. of Afr. American

-1.552***
(0.341)

5809.5***
(1006.9)

-1.682***
(0.347)

5546.4***
(1071.5)

-1.672***
(0.348)

3311.9***
(986.2)

Last Year IUP only
Dummy

0.804***
(0.0833)

19.23**
(9.677)

0.850***
(0.0862)

17.70*
(9.710)

Repeated Funding
dummy

0.592***
(0.0610)

Water Flow
[Mgal/ Year]

Con_Corruption
*PCIncome

lambda
Year Controls
State Controls
Facility Controls
Observations
Goodness of fit measure:
Wald chi2 (p value)

3.521e+07***
(1.326e+07)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
10,914
591
87.24 (0.00)

0.611***
(0.0631)
2.970e+07**
(1.281e+07)

Yes
Yes
No
10,388

87.24 (0.00)

0.888***
(0.0872)

23.71**
(9.85)

0.613***
(0.0641)

Yes
No
Yes
547

3.695e+07***
(1.235e+07)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
10,306
525
450.84 (0.00)
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Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.

result is similar to prior findings in the context of financial support for drinking water systems. Jocoy
(2000) documents that small drinking water systems are less likely to receive financial support then
large systems. However, I observe limited evidence of the difference in the magnitudes of the intended
awards across large and small wastewater systems. Prior literature suggests that many small drinking
water systems lack administrative and managerial skills (Marrocco et al., 1993; Shanaghan, 1994; NRC,
1997) and have less access to funding information and related resources relative to their larger counterparts (Anderson, 1984). Similar argument could be made for wastewater treatment facilities. Consequently, the EPA encourages prioritizing small communities in allocating CWSRFs (EPA, 1994).
Our results show that in terms loan distribution intentions, while smaller wastewater facilities are less
likely to receive CWSRF support, the sizes of the intended loans do not differ depending on the facility
size. Hence, on a per capita basis, stated intentions for CWSRF distribution prioritize smaller facilities.
Intended allocation of CWSRF assistance is associated with inspection and especially enforcement in the previous year. Table 3.2, model 1, shows that facilities with greater number of inspection
and especially enforcement actions are more likely to be the intended recipients of CWSRF assistance.
However, the magnitude of the planned award is not related to inspection or enforcement actions in
the previous year. State regulators may be relying on inspection and enforcement to verify compliance
with necessary management practices and requirements and ensure readiness to utilize the funds prior
to disbursement (GEFA, 2007). Hence, facilities targeted for CWSRF awards may be subject to additional inspection and enforcement in preceding years.
Obtaining federal water pollution control funding can be more difficult for small, low-income,
and minority communities (EPA, 1994). According to EPA (1991, 1993) low-income communities
often have difficulties with matching requirements. Previous environmental policy research suggests
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that jurisdictions with greater financial resources spend more on environmental protection (Lester &
Lombard, 1990). Low-income communities are also underrepresented in state and local government
decision making (e.g., Goldman, 1994; Hamilton, 1995) and can be at a disadvantage when competing
for federal grants due to lack of administrative expertise and access to technical resources. Accordingly, EPA encourages prioritizing disadvantaged communities in CWSRF allocation. I find a negative
and statistically significant effect of per capita income on CWSRF distribution intentions. The facilities
in richer counties are less likely to be the intended recipients of CWSRF loans. Furthermore, larger
loans are intended for the facilities in lower income communities. Such distribution plans are consistent with EPA recommendations to prioritize low income communities and may be reflecting
greater need for infrastructure improvement in lower income communities.
Policymakers’ environmental decisions may also be associated with community ethnic or racial
composition. Lavelle and Coyle (1992) find that polluters accused of violating environmental regulations in the areas with more minorities face more lenient enforcement penalties. On the other hand,
Viscusi and Hamilton (1999) find that regulators impose stricter cleanup targets for hazardous waste
sites in areas with more minorities, but low-income areas are more likely to suffer from landfills and
hazardous waste sites. Gray and Shadbegian (2004) study the regulatory stringency for air and water
polluting facilities and do not find a significant relationship between race, penalties and the frequency
of inspections. However, they find lower pollution by plants near communities with more non-white
population. I observe that facilities in the counties with larger share of African American population
are less likely be the intended recipients of the loans. However, among the facilities that are listed as
intended recipients, larger loans are allocated to the treatment plants in counties with greater share of
African American residents.
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The results in model 1 show that corruption has a negative association with stated funding
intentions. In states with greater number of corruption-related criminal convictions, facilities are less
likely to be included in the list of intended CWSRF loan recipients. Greater corruption can be indicative of weaker rule of law, weaker government institutions, and less access to funding. These factors
can have a negative effect on the number of intended loan awards to wastewater treatment projects.
Model 1 results also show that facilities in richer counties of more corrupted states are more likely to
be included in the list of intended recipients than the corresponding facilities in less corrupted states.
The positive coefficient for the interaction between income and corruption indicates, that although
state corruption has a negative effect on the probability of a facility being included in the list of intended CWSRF recipients, county income can offset some of this effect. Similarly, although poorer
communities are prioritized in funding intentions, corruption can offset this effect.
IUP funding intentions also depend upon previous years’ distribution of support as assessed
with binary variables of whether a facility was funded in previous years and if a facility was intended
to be funded in the previous year but did not receive support. Both binary variables of whether a
facility was funded in previous years and if a facility was intended to be funded in the previous year
are statistically significant and positive. The likelihood of a facility being included in the list of intended
CWSRF recipients is greater if funding was provided in previous years or if the facility was included
in the IUP last year but was not funded. The magnitude of the award is also larger for those facilities
which were included in the IUP but did not receive the support in the preceding year.
3.5.2

Revealed priorities in observed support
Next, I present the results for the observed CWSRF assistance allocation using data from ARs

(Table 3.3). As in the previous section, three Heckman selection models show the two-part results for
the probability of receiving the CWSRF support and for the magnitude of the award. Model 1 presents
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the results using cumulative number of violations across all regulated pollutants, while models 2 and
3 present the corresponding results for exceedances of BOD and SS permit limits respectively.
The results show that distribution of CWSRF loans reflects the need for financial support by
facilities with poorer compliance. I observe from the results in model 1 that at a 5% statistical significance level, facilities with greater number of violations in previous three years have higher probabilities
of receiving CWSRF support. However, compliance is not a significant factor for the magnitude of
the award. Scott et al. (2018) demonstrate the implications of fiscal capacity for a drinking water system
on infrastructure quality and compliance with the CWA. Adequate investment in wastewater infrastructure can also be critical for NPDES compliance (Ramseur, 2018). Although the magnitudes of
the awards don’t depend on the total number of violations across all regulated pollutants, Model 3
shows that larger loans are allocated to facilities with more SS discharge violations in the preceding
three years. Comparison of tables 3.2 and 3.3 reveals some consistency in regulators’ stated intentions
and revealed priorities in terms of the facilities’ non-compliance records. Greater likelihood of intent
to fund facilities with more NPDES violations is consistently executed as regulators are more likely to
provide support to facilities with poorer compliance records. Such priorities follow the EPA’s guidelines, which suggest that states should invest in improving compliance with the Clean Water Act (IFA
2019, USEPA 2001, VDEC, 2019).
Most of the coefficients for the impaired water variable are statistically significant at least at
the 10 percent statistical significance level. Hence, there is some evidence that CWSRF distribution
prioritizes receiving surface water’s impairment. The facilities that discharge into impaired watersheds
a) are more likely to receive financial support and b) receive larger loans. This result is inconsistent
with the intended distribution results in table 3.2. Hence, although the receiving stream’s quality is not
an important determinant of CWSRF distribution plans, the observed CWSRF assistance allocation
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Table 3.3. Determinants of likelihood and magnitude of observed CWSRF support
Model 1
Model 2
VARIABLES
(All pollutants)
(BOD)
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
0.00590**
.263688
AvgNPDES Violn for last 3
(0.00271)
(.216867)
years
Avg. load of BOD over
-3.39e-06
.00214
limit in previous 3 years
(7.50e-06)
(.001417)
AvgLoad of SS over limit in
previous 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

0.106*
(0.0588)

32.62***
(9.637)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
BOD last 3 Year

0.110*
(0.0622)

42.41***
(11.80)

4.57e-06
(1.19e-05)

.00872***
(.0027)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
SS last 3 Year

Model 3
(SS)

Selection
Estimation

Level
Estimation

-1.73e-06
(3.13e-06)

.00203***
(.0003)

0.0996
(0.0626)

52.46***
(12.28)

2.89e-05*
(1.49e-05)

.016152***
(.0037)

1.78e-05***
(4.56e-06)

-.00004
(.000480)

2.15e-05***
(5.92e-06)

-.000558
(.0004)

1.50e-05**
(6.67e-06)

-.00039
(.0004)

Inspection lag1

0.0153**
(0.00704)

-.392412
(.369901)

0.0155**
(0.00743)

-.304576
(.327459)

0.0162**
(0.00752)

-.065984
(.331953)

Enforcement Action lag1

0.0175
(0.0495)

5.351
(3.351)

0.0313
(0.0505)

4.260
(2.848)

0.0337
(0.0505)

8.452***
(2.886)

Per Capita
Income

-.0201***
(.0019)

-.302
(.187)

-.020***
(.0021)

-.493***
(.155)

-.021***
(.002)

-.397**
(0.167)

Con_Corruption

-73.81*
(39.69)

-3959.9
(7649.4)

-68.48*
(39.18)

-7654.7
(6470.8)

-67.66*
(38.72)

-11577.1*
(6538.9)

Prop. of Afr. American

-0.577
(0.468)

2.403e+09***
(5.780e+08)

-0.675
(0.477)

1450.1***
(509.6)

-0.702
(0.481)

1530.7***
(508.9)

Con_Corruption* PerCncome

1.49**
(0.745)

130.3
(163.3)

1.39*
(0.739)

.191690
(.138662)

1.37*
(0.730)

233.1*
(139.3)

Last Year IUP only Dummy

0.305***
(0.114)

11.32***
(4.347)

0.372***
(0.118)

6.123*
(3.543)

0.409***
(0.119)

4.321
(3.868)

Repeated Funding dummy

0.781***
(0.069)

Water Flow
[Mgal/ Year]

lambda
Year Controls
State Controls
Facility Controls
Observations
Goodness of fit measure:
Wald chi2 (p value)

1.300e+07**
(5.159e+06)

Yes
Yes
No
10,914

87.24 (0.00)

0.825***
(0.072)

Yes
No
Yes
305

-1.005e+06
(4.651e+06)

Yes
Yes
No
10,388

Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.

87.24 (0.00)

0.808***
(0.073)

Yes
No
Yes
274

-7.099e+06
(5.070e+06)

Yes
Yes
No
10,306

Yes
No
Yes
268

450.84 (0.00)
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may be prioritizing wastewater treatment plants that discharge into impaired streams. Observed prioritization of impaired watersheds is consistent with EPA’s recommendations for CWSRF distribution (USEPA 2012).
Facilities with less stringent BOD (model 2) and SS (model 3) permit limits receive larger loans.
This result is consistent with the stated intention results in table 3.2. Hence, stated intentions as well
as observed CWSRF distributions indicate prioritization of facilities with laxer BOD and SS permits
for larger loans. Financial support may be channeled to improve wastewater discharge of facilities with
less stringent NPDES permits in circumstances when increasing permit stringency may be politically
difficult or impractical due to costs of compliance. The loans may be intended to support efforts to
wastewater discharge quality before permit stringency is strengthened (GEFA, 2020).
Greater number of inspections increases the likelihood of receiving CWSRF assistance. Before
providing CWSRF loans, state authorities may need to verify the candidate facility’s compliance with
existing management guidelines, readiness to begin the project, and the required documentation and
paperwork (GEFA, 2007). Similar, but statistically weaker result is observed for the intended distribution in table 3.2. The results also show that inspection is only associated with the likelihood of receiving CWSRF support but not the magnitude. In terms of enforcement, observed distribution does not
seem to be consistent with intended CWSRF use. The results in table 3.2 suggest that facilities that
are subject to more enforcement actions are more likely to be included in the list of intended recipients.
However, the observed distribution of the loans does not appear to depend on enforcement actions
in previous years.
I observe that small facilities are less likely to receive financial support then larger ones. This
result is consistent with the stated intention results in table 3.2 and with the prior literature documenting smaller systems’ lack of access to funding opportunities (Marrocco et al., 1993; Shanaghan, 1994;
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NRC, 1997; Anderson, 1984; Jocoy 2000). However, the magnitudes of the observed CWSRF awards
do not depend on the size of the facility. Although there is some indication that smaller facilities may
be prioritized for larger loans in the planning stage, the magnitudes of observed awards do not depend
on the sizes of the receiving facilities.
The results show that poor communities are more likely to receive the CWSRF support. Models 2 and 3 also indicate that facilities in poorer communities may also be receiving larger loans. The
prioritization of poorer communities is consistent with the CWSRF intended use results in table 3.2,
and with EPA’s recommendations for supporting disadvantaged communities (GAO, 2006). The observed prioritization of facilities in poorer counties may be reflecting a greater need for infrastructure
improvement in disadvantaged counties.
Funded treatment plants located in counties with a larger share of African American population receive larger loans relative to the funded facilities located in counties with a smaller share of
African Americans. This is consistent with stated distribution intentions in table 3.2. Such prioritization may be consistent with the EPA recommendations to prioritize marginalized communities, which
are often disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards as a result of low incomes, less education, or restricted mobility (Hamilton, 1995; Switzer and Teodoro, 2018; Konisky and Teodoro, 2016;
Allaire et al. 2018). The results also show that although in the probability of being included in the list
of intended recipients is lower for the facilities in counties with larger African American population,
this pattern is not observed in the actual CWSRF loan allocations.
Prior literature shows that corruption reduces capital investment (Brunetti and Weder 1998;
Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder 1998; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1998). In addition, strength of
environmental programs wanes with the increase in the number of public officials who are convicted
of violating corruption laws (Woods, 2008). Although statistical evidence is not strong, I observe that
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greater state corruption is associated with lower the likelihood of receiving CWSRF loans. This result
is consistent with the stated intention results in table 3.2. I also observe a statistically significant interaction between income and corruption, especially in model 1. This suggests that facilities in richer
counties of more corrupt states are more likely to receive CWSRF than richer facilities in less corrupt
states. This finding is consistent with the previous work documenting the influence of corruption on
CWA compliance (Grooms, 2015)
Similar to the models in table 3.2, I control for repeated funding and find that facilities funded
in previous years are likely to be funded again. I also control for the effect of some facilities being
included in the previous year’s IUP but not receiving CWSRF support for budgetary shortfall, documentation, or other reasons. The facilities that were in previous year’s IUP but did not receive support
are more likely to be included in the next year’s IUP and receive support. These facilities also tend to
receive larger loans, which may require more documentation and preparatory work than the smaller
loans. As a result, the disbursement of larger awards may be delayed.
3.5.3

Consistencies and differences between the lists of facilities included in the IUPs and ARs
Approximately 67% of wastewater treatment facilities listed in IUPs do not receive CWSRF

support, and approximately 36% of facilities that receive CWSRF loans are not listed IUPs. Consistencies and differences between the lists of facilities included in the IUPs and ARs represent the degree
of consistency between stated and observed priorities for distributing financial support across
wastewater treatment plants. The analysis of IUPs and ARs in tables 3.4 and 3.5 document the consistencies and discrepancies between stated intentions and observed distribution of CWSRF support.
Some, but not all, of the discrepancies may be due to budget limitations as facilities initially included
in the IUP are not funded and as facilities excluded from IUPs are often funded. In this section, I
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explore the consistencies and inconsistencies between stated intentions and observed funding outcomes by first focusing on the facility-year observations included in IUPs and examining the factors
that are associated with delivery of the planned loan. Next, I focus on the actual loan awards and
examine the factors that are correlated with having been identified as the intended recipients of the
loans versus receiving the loans without being included in the list of intended recipients.
I first examine the intended awards from the IUP reports to identify the factors that are associated with facilities not being funded despite being included in the IUPs using logit regressions (Table
3.4) with state and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is one if the facility is included in both
the IUP and AR and zero if the facility appears only in the IUP. The results suggest that facilities
discharging into impaired watersheds are more likely to be funded when they are included in the list
of intended CWSRF recipients. This suggests that the regulators more consistently make loan disbursement decisions following their stated intentions when facilities discharge into the impaired watershed. While discharge receiving watershed’s quality does not influence the stated intentions (table
3.2), if the facility is included in the intended list, it is more likely to be funded if it is discharging into
an impaired watershed then if it is not (table 3.4).
While there is no statistical correlation between inspections and the likelihood of being included in the list of intended recipients (table 3.2), if the facility is included in the list of intended
recipients then the CWSRF is more likely to provide the loan to facilities that were subject to more
inspections in the previous year. Also, conditional on being included in the IUP, previously funded
facilities are more likely to be funded relative to the facilities that were not previously funded. Support
for some of the wastewater treatment improvement projects is likely to be provided in multiple installments. Therefore, some of the facilities that are awarded a CWSRF loan one year are likely to be
included in subsequent IUP and AR.
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Table 3.4: Observed funding of facilities listed as intended recipients
VARIABLES
Model 1
(All Pollutants)
0.0136
Average Annual NPDES Violation for
(0.0103)
last 3 years

Model 2
(BOD)

-1.69e-05
(8.63e-05)

Average Load of BOD over permit limit
in previous 3 years

1.01e-05
(2.21e-05)

Average Load of Solid over permit limit
in previous 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

Model 3
(SS)

0.452**
(0.212)

0.429*
(0.235)

0.430*
(0.246)

-1.13e-05
(6.59e-05)

Average daily Permit limit of BOD
previous three Year

3.88e-05
(6.90e-05)

Average daily Permit limit of Solid
previous three Year
Water Flow
[Mgal/ Year]

5.97e-06
(1.49e-05)

1.68e-05
(1.97e-05)

7.00e-06
(2.29e-05)

Inspection in previous
Year

0.0493**
(0.0237)

0.0606**
(0.0250)

0.0666**
(0.0264)

Enforcement Action in
Previous Year

-0.0779
(0.157)

-0.0534
(0.162)

-0.0571
(0.165)

Per Capita
Income

-.001
(.0067)

.003
(7.54e-06)

3.01e-06
(7.71e-06)

Corruption

-1.12e-06
(6.60e-06)

3.02e-06
(7.54e-06)

3.01e-06
(7.71e-06)

Prop. of Afr. American

1.731
(1.715)

1.802
(1.817)

1.390
(1.859)

Con_Corruption* PerCncome

-1.08
(9.69)

-2.91
(9.70)

-3.04
(9.60)

-0.596*
(0.309)
1.191***
(0.234)
Yes
Yes
591

-0.597*
(0.322)
1.260***
(0.247)
Yes
Yes
547

-0.537
(0.344)
1.222***
(0.269)
Yes
Yes
525

Last Year IUP only Dummy
Repeated Funding dummy
Year Controls
State Controls
Observations

Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.

Next, I use the loan award observations from the annual reports to examine the factors that
may be associated with funding facilities that are not included in the IUP documents (table 3.5). The
dependent variable is one if a facility is funded and included in the IUP and zero if the facility was
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funded but not included in the IUP17. Consistent with table 3.4, facilities located in impaired watersheds are more likely to have been included in the list of intended recipients and funded compared to
funded facilities that discharge non-impaired watersheds. Hence, watershed impairment is prioritized
in intended and observed allocation of CWSRF loans and is a significant factor for consistency between intended allocation and observed disbursement.
County income is a statistically significant determinant of consistency between the lists of
intended CWSRF recipients and observed awardees. Facilities located in the counties with higher per
capita income are more likely to have been identified as intended recipients than funded facilities in
counties with lower per capita incomes. This result suggests that facilities located in higher income
counties are funded with greater consistency between stated intentions and observed distributions.
However, this result also suggests that facilities located in poorer counties are more likely to be funded
even when they are not identified as intended recipients than the facilities in richer counties. This
implies that state agencies may be more flexible about funding facilities in poorer counties than the
facilities in richer counties without identifying them as intended recipients in the corresponding IUPs.
Since disadvantaged communities may lack resources necessary to follow the procedures for inclusion
in the IUPs (Jocoy, 2000), the facilities in these counties may be prioritized for funding without inclusion in IUPs relative to the facilities from counties with higher income. Similar to previous results in
tables 3.3 and 3.4, regulators may be prioritizing facilities in disadvantaged communities where
wastewater treatment plants are often in most need of the assistance (USEPA, 2012).

The results from the Two stage Heckman models using the subsamples of facilities’ included in IUP and AR lists, examining both likelihood of being included in IUP/AR and the magnitude of funding, are provided in the appendix tables
A3 and A4 respectively. Results show no significant covariates for the second stage estimates for the size of the loans.
17
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There is also some evidence of repeated funding. Funded facilities are more likely to have been
identified as intended recipients when they were also funded in previous years as opposed to previously unfunded facilities. This result is consistent with table 3.2, which shows that previously funded
Table 3.5: Inclusion of funded facilities in the lists of intended recipients
VARIABLES
Model 1
(All Pollutants)
0.0106
Average Annual NPDES Violation for
last 3 years
(0.0120)
Average Load of BOD over permit limit
in previous 3 years

Model 2
(BOD)

-0.000206*
(0.000117)

Average Load of SS over permit limit in
previous 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

Model 3
(SS)

-1.53e-05
(2.88e-05)
0.720***
(0.263)

Average daily Permit limit of BOD
previous three Year

0.693**
(0.287)

0.735**
(0.303)

-0.000148*
(7.89e-05)
-0.000129
(8.36e-05)

Average daily Permit limit of Solid
previous three Year
Water Flow[Mgal/ Year]

1.77e-07
(1.94e-05)

2.98e-05
(2.73e-05)

3.22e-05
(3.06e-05)

Inspection in
previous Year

-0.00396
(0.0304)

-0.00196
(0.0320)

-0.000297
(0.0349)

Enforcement Action in
Previous Year

-0.0340
(0.194)

-0.0369
(0.204)

-0.105
(0.209)

Per Capita
Income

.026**
(.010)

.041***
(.013)

.036***
(.012)

Corruption

-2.842
(307.7)

117.9
(353.2)

141.8
(341.2)

Prop of Afr American

-0.302
(2.247)

1.853
(2.471)

0.989
(2.487)

Con_Corruption* PerCncome

-1.97
(6.63)

-5.46
(8.30)

-5.90
(8.03)

-0.0149
(0.432)
0.649**
(0.289)
Yes
Yes
305

-0.0584
(0.453)
0.612**
(0.302)
Yes
Yes
274

-0.00720
(0.499)
0.819**
(0.332)
Yes
Yes
258

Last Year IUP only Dummy
Repeated Funding dummy
Year Controls
State Controls
Observations

Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.
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facilities are more likely to be listed as intended recipients. Among the funded facilities, there is greater
consistency between stated intentions and observed disbursements for facilities that received funding
previously. This result is expected in the circumstances when financial support is provided in the form
of multiple loans over time.

3.5.

Conclusion
CWSRF program was established to provide funding for projects that aim to improve surface

water quality and support compliance with the CWA (Copeland 2012; Travis et al. 2004). The majority
of the loans awarded under the CWSRF program are allocated to publicly owned wastewater treatment
plants. This paper contributes to the literature on compliance with CWA and to the literature on the
use of public funds for environmental protection, by examining the CWSRF allocation decisions. Prior
literature on CWA documents concerns about lack of sufficient improvements in water quality despite
significant investments (Adler et al. 1993; Knopman and Smith 1993; Harrington et al. 2004). Deficiency of investment in treatment infrastructure has also been documented (USEPA 2016c). I evaluate
CWSRF allocation to wastewater treatment facilities in terms of receiving surface water quality, prior
compliance record, facility size and other economic and demographic factors. I also examine the disparities and consistencies between stated intentions and observed distributions CWSRF loans. I examine the lists of facilities included in the IUPs and ARs that state authorities submit to the EPA as
part of the CWSRF program requirements. The comparison sheds light on the priorities of state funding decisions.
The results show that states prioritize facilities with poorer compliance records. According to
both IUPs and ARs, cumulative violations across all regulated pollutants are positively correlated with
funding intentions and awards. In this regard, stated intentions and observed disbursements are consistent. Hence, compliance with NPDES permits is consistently prioritized in CWSRF disbursement
82

decisions. However, pollutant specific violations for BOD and SS do not have consistent effects on
CWSRF allocation decisions. Lack of evidence in support of pollutant specific compliance prioritization is consistent with Harrington & Malinovskaya (2015), who find that that loans are not allocated
to plants which struggle with compliance in terms of BOD and organic nitrogen. However, our results
show that the aggregate number of violations across all regulated pollutants plays an important role in
stated and observed CWSRF funding decisions. Compliance record matters for funding decisions but
not for the magnitude of either the planned or observed financial assistance. However, the magnitudes
of the planned and awarded loans are negatively correlated with BOD and SS permit stringency. Regulators may be prioritizing facilities with less stringent permits in support of the efforts to improve
pollutant discharge when tightening permit limits implies excessive compliance costs and/or is not
politically feasible.
Many states have adopted watershed goal approach to water quality management following
EPA guidance (Rahm et al. 2013). I find that watershed impairment does not improve the chances of
a facility being included on the IUP. However, state regulators are more likely to provide financial
assistance to facilities which are discharging into impaired watersheds once those facilities are on the
intended list. Furthermore, loans awarded to facilities that discharge into impaired watershed are
greater than loans awarded to facilities discharging into watersheds that are not marked as impaired
by the EPA. Hence, in terms of prioritizing watershed impairment, revealed priorities are not consistent with stated intentions.
The results provide evidence that disadvantaged communities are consistently prioritized in
CWSRF allocation decisions, both in terms of revealed and stated priorities following EPA’s recommendations (GAO, 2006). Facilities in poorer communities are more likely to be the intended recipients and more likely to receive financial assistance (GAO, 2006; Jocoy, 2000; Mullin & Daley, 2018).
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In terms of the magnitude of the awards, larger loans are intended for facilities in poorer communities.
However, such distribution is not observed in the awarded loans. IUPs reveal that facilities in counties
with larger shares of African American populations are less likely to be the targeted recipients. However, observed awards do not confirm such prioritization. In terms of the magnitude of the awarded
loans, IUPs and ARs consistently show prioritization of facilities located in counties with larger shares
of African American. This result contradicts some of the findings in the previous literature showing
that state regulators do not prioritize drinking water facilities in non-white communities (Konisky et
al. 2021; Konisky and Teodoro, 2016).
Smaller facilities are less likely to be included in the list of intended recipients and less likely
to receive financial support than larger facilities. This result is consistent with some of the findings in
the previous literature documenting less financial support being available to smaller facilities then to
larger ones (Shanaghan 1994; Jocoy 2000).
State corruption is a significant factor for both the stated and the observed priorities in
CWSRF allocation. Facilities in more corrupted states are less likely to be funded then the facilities in
less corrupted stated. Also, the probability of receiving support is larger for facilities located in richer
counties of more corrupted states than richer counties in less corrupted states. Corruption can reduce
the share of social expenditures (Delavallade, 2006), which can reduce funding availability for CWSRF
program. Grooms (2015) documents the effect of corruption on violations and inspection actions
under CWA. She suggests that NPDES permit violations may be under-reported in corrupt states.
Our work finds some evidence in support of the idea that corruption may be influencing the allocation
CWSRF assistance.
Distribution of CWSRF assistance generally is expected to be consistent with the IUPs. I document consistencies as well as in inconsistencies in priorities between stated funding intentions and
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observed allocation of CWSRF support. Most facilities that are listed as intended recipients of CWSRF
loans receive the loans as planned. However, some facilities listed in the IUPs do not receive support,
while other facilities receive loans even when they are not included in the IUP lists. Facilities located
within impaired watersheds are a significant factor associated with increased inconsistency between
stated intentions and observed disbursement of CWSRF. Previous year’s inspection is also a significant
factor for funding of facilities listed in IUPs. Income is a significant factor for whether the funded
facilities are also identified as intended recipients in the planning stage. Funded facilities in higher
income counties are more likely to be identified as intended recipients than in poorer counties. Hence,
facilities that are funded without being identified as planned recipients tend to be in poorer counties.
These findings contain some important implications for federal as well as the local environmental quality agencies who need to balance social equity and economic efficiency goals in distributing
CWSRF support. Economically efficient distribution of CWSRF is such that the benefits from distribution are maximized in terms of the value of improvement in wastewater discharge quality. This
objective can be in conflict with the social equity objective in some cases. Although EPA provides
some recommendations on the factors that should be considered when allocating CWSRF, state regulators ultimately determine the mechanism to balance equity and economic efficiency goals. This
paper documents the priorities that are implied by the stated plans for CWSRF use and priorities
revealed by the observed distribution of CWSRF support. I show that the distribution of CWSRF
follows efficiency priorities by prioritizing facilities with poorer compliance records, and equity priorities by prioritizing disadvantaged communities at least to some degree.
Our results are limited by the temporal and spatial scope of the analysis. Even though established in 1987, the data on CWSRF is available only from 2010 and only for a few states. As a consequence, it is difficult to generalize our results for the US as a whole. Such data limitations hinder long-
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run and large scale analysis of CWSRF allocation across greater number of jurisdictions. Our results
are also subject to the quality of the data used in the analysis. Although all point source discharge
facilities are required to obtain an NPDES permit under the CWA, not all facility, permit, or discharge
monitoring data are reported by the facilities in ICIS-NPDES. Furthermore, reporting quality differs
across states, facilities, and over time.
I provide a partial analysis of financial support for wastewater treatment facilities in the nine
states. While CWSRF is a major funding mechanism, states and facilities can also rely on funding from
other programs including Rural Utilities Service Water and Environmental Programs (USDA), Community Development Block Grants (USDHUD), and Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation
Act Program (EPA). Future research should extend our work by combining funding awards from
multiple sources to provide a fuller representation of financial support available for the wastewater
treatment facilities.
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Appendix 3A
Table A3.1. Determinants of likelihood and magnitude of intended CWSRF support with facility fixed effects.
VARIABLES
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
0.0262**
AvgNPDES Violn for last 3
-.010017
years
(0.0107)
(.628259)
Avg. load of BOD over
-1.51e-05
-.00002
limit in previous 3 years
(1.43e-05)
(.00054)
AvgLoad of SS over limit in
previous 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

-0.244
(0.506)

2.182
(30.69)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
BOD last 3 Year
Avg. daily Permit limit of
SS last 3 Year
Water Flow
[Mgal/ Year]

-0.310
(0.656)

17.4
(40.79)

0.000402
(0.000353)

.0133***
(.0042)

-2.24e-06
(1.59e-05)

.0005
(.0008)

-0.186
(0.622)

19.15
(40.01)

.0651***
(.0102)
-.00004
(.0009)

1.14e-05
(2.33e-05)

-.001027
(.0009)

7.50e-06
(2.57e-05)

-.00033
(.0009)

0.000371
(0.000354)
1.43e-05
(2.50e-05)

Inspection lag1

-0.0145
(0.0168)

.299069
(.883733)

-0.0241
(0.0179)

-.315502
(.894630)

-0.0217
(0.0183)

-.7131
(.9247)

Enforcement Action lag1

-0.0450
(0.107)

-4.640
(4.929)

0.0184
(0.110)

-3.220
(4.767)

0.0218
(0.110)

-1.377
(4.749)

County Per Capita
Income

.0022
(.006)

-.389
(.309)

.0004
(.0069)

-.128
(.436)

.0009
(.006)

-.357
(.375)

Con_Corruption

-103.7
(99.33)

-2931.9
(7065.5)

-100.6
(102.2)

-2063.2
(6883.4)

-111.5
(104.0)

-3694.7
(6773.5)

10.33
(26.92)

7695.4***
(1737. 3)

2.264
(27.45)

7221.4***
(1821.1)

13.09
(27.82)

6174.4***
(1838.2)

0.700
(2.07)

123.3
(181.9)

0. 538
(2.14)

59.13
(177.8)

0.493
(2.18)

85.6
(174.865)

-0.703***
(0.171)

4.749
(8.358)

-0.677***
(0.175)

-2.819
(8.736)

-0.686***
(0.182)

-3.869
(8.436)

Prop. of Afr. American
Con_Corruption* PerCncome
Last Year IUP only Dummy

Repeated Funding dummy

-1.282***
(0.204)

lambda
Year Controls
Facility Controls
Observations
Goodness of fit measure:
Wald chi2 (p value)

Yes
Yes
1,957

-2.355e+07
(1.455e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

-1.172***
(0.216)

Yes
Yes
258

Yes
Yes
1,819

6.473e+06
(1.581e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

-1.228***
(0.224)

Yes
Yes
274

Yes
Yes
1,729

7.001e+06
(1.798e+07)

Yes
Yes
315

450.84 (0.00)
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Table A3.2. Determinants of likelihood and magnitude of observed CWSRF support with facility fixed effects
VARIABLES
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
AvgNPDES Violn for last 3
0.0326**
.0635
years
(0.0142)
(.3585)
Avg. load of BOD over
-1.51e-05
.0022***
limit in previous 3 years
(5.43e-05)
(.0006)
AvgLoad of SS over limit in
previous 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

-4.12e-06
(2.04e-05)
-135.9***
(2728)

1.126
(0.769)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
BOD last 3 Year
Avg. daily Permit limit of
SS last 3 Year
Water Flow
[Mgal/ Year]

1.234
(0.954)

.0011
(.003)

1.226
(0.922)

0.000304*
(0.000179)

.0209**
(.0081)

3.90e-06
(2.74e-05)

.0011*
(.0005)

3.47e-07
(2.87e-05)

.0008
(.0006)

0.000519
(0.000396)
7.06e-06
(2.80e-05)

-0.00155
(0.0221)

-.602528
(.5218)

-0.00289
(0.0230)

-.8313
(.572)

-0.00172
(0.0241)

-.915
(.623)

Enforcement Action lag1

0.0832
(0.135)

5.045
(5.485)

0.101
(0.138)

4.418
(5.670)

0.132
(0.142)

10.03
(6.121)

County Per Capita
Income

-.003
(.008)

-.275
(.298)

.0017
(.009)

-.256
(.273)

.003
(.009)

-.283
(.223)

Con_Corruption

-77.30
(121.9)

-3660.7
(12000.1)

-56.20
(120.2)

-2517.5
(12030.4)

-57.87
(123.6)

-7204.03
(13720.7)

-40.37
(30.88)

920.1
(1.034.9)

-48.24
(31.40)

1014.7
(1045.9)

-27.71
(34.52)

1028.9
(1142.8)

2.67
(2.92)

83.2
(250.3)

1.87
(2.90)

65.7
(251.2)

1.94
(2.98)

.120.4
(286.7)

-0.528**
(0.261)

.184
(6.054)

-0.500*
(0.265)

-.3369
(6.231)

-0.457
(0.279)

-.336
(6.231)

Inspection lag1

Prop. of Afr. American
Con_Corruption* PerCncome
Last Year IUP only Dummy

Repeated Funding dummy

-2.523***
(0.263)

lambda
Year Controls
Facility Controls
Observations
Goodness of fit measure:
Wald chi2 (p value)

Yes
Yes
1,275

-2.355e+07
(1.455e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

-2.446***
(0.272)

Yes
Yes
339

Yes
Yes
1,168

6.473e+06
(1.581e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

.0068
(.0054)
.0001
(.0006)

-2.599***
(0.290)

Yes
Yes
307

Yes
Yes
1,104

7.001e+06
(1.798e+07)

Yes
Yes
276

450.84 (0.00)
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Table A3.3. Observed funding of facilities listed as intended recipients with facility fixed effects.
VARIABLES
Model 1
Model 2
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
0.0136
-1.106
AvgNPDES Violn for last 3
years
(0.0103)
(2.260)
Avg. load of BOD over
-1.69e-05
.0032
limit in previous 3 years
(8.63e-05)
(.0335)
AvgLoad of SS over limit in
previous 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

0.452**
(0.212)

-143.1*
(77.05)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
BOD last 3 Year

0.429*
(0.235)

62.09
(58.4)

-1.13e-05
(6.59e-05)

.0199
(.0163)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
SS last 3 Year

Model 3
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation

1.01e-05
(2.21e-05)

.0013
(.0018)

0.430*
(0.246)

24.43
(94.45)

3.88e-05
(6.90e-05)

.1424***

Water Flow
[Mgal/ Year]

5.97e-06
(1.49e-05)

-.002
(.0017)

1.68e-05
(1.97e-05)

-.0019
(.0017)

7.00e-06
(2.29e-05)

(.0405)
-.0009
(.0019)

Inspection lag1

0.0493**
(0.0237)

-2.620
(2.10)

0.0606**
(0.0250)

-3.107
(2.222)

0.0666**
(0.0264)

-3.326
(2.22)

Enforcement Action lag1

-0.0779
(0.157)

-3.758
(17.56)

-0.0534
(0.162)

-15.17
(17.31)

-0.0571
(0.165)

-2.679
(17.01)

County Per Capita
Income

-.001
(.006)

-1.44*
(.724)

.003
(.007)

-0.573
(.781)

.003
(.007)

-.989
(.765)

Con_Corruption

-81.9
(414.9)

-40591.1
(38870.9)

-.7115
(409.7)

-25852.8
(40946.8)

22.98
(403.1)

-41463.8
(35870.4)

1.731
(1.715)

-5396.6
(4382.7)

1.802
(1.817)

-3915.8
(4263.5)

1.802
(1.817)

-3051.9
(3941.89)

-1.08
(9.70)

802.6
(801.1)

-2.91
(9.70)

339.0
(814.9)

-3.04
(9.60)

717.6
(788.4)

-0.596*
(0.309)

37.70
(25.01)

-0.597*
(0.322)

8.651
(25.95)

-0.597*
(0.322)

4.618
(23.75)

Prop. of Afr. American
Con_Corruption* PerCncome
Last Year IUP only Dummy

Repeated Funding dummy

1.191***
(0.234)

lambda
Year Controls
State Controls
Facility Controls
Observations
Goodness of fit measure:
Wald chi2 (p value)

Yes
Yes
No
591

-2.309e+07
(4.872e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

1.260***
(0.247)

Yes
No
Yes
219

Yes
Yes
No
547

3.336e+07
(4.811e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

1.222***
(0.269)

Yes
No
Yes
196

Yes
Yes
No
525

1.788e+07
(4.582e+07)

Yes
No
Yes
177

450.84 (0.00)
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Table A3.4. Inclusion of funded facilities in the lists of intended recipients with Heckman model.
VARIABLES
Model 1
Model 2
Selection
Level
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
0.0106
-1.106
AvgNPDES Violn for last 3
years
(0.012)
(2.260)
Avg. load of BOD over
-0.000206*
.0032
limit in previous 3 years
(0.000117)
(.0335)
AvgLoad of SS over limit in
previous 3 years
Impaired Water
Dummy

0.720***
(0.263)

-143.1*
(77.05)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
BOD last 3 Year

0.693**
(0.287)

62.09
(58.40)

-0.000148*
(7.89e-05)

.01993
(.0163)

Avg. daily Permit limit of
SS last 3 Year

Model 3
Selection
Level
Estimation
Estimation

-1.53e-05
(2.88e-05)

.0013
(.00189)

0.430*
(0.246)

24.43
(94.45)

-0.000129
(8.36e-05)

.1424***

Water Flow
[Mgal/ Year]

1.77e-07
(1.94e-05)

-..0021
(00.17)

2.98e-05
(2.73e-05)

-.0019
(.0017)

3.22e-05
(3.06e-05)

(.0405)
-.00097
(.00019)

Inspection lag1

-0.00396
(0.0304)

-2.620
(2.100)

-0.00196
(0.0320)

-3.107
(2.222)

-0.000297
(0.0349)

-3.326
(2.229)

Enforcement Action lag1

-0.0340
(0.194)

-3.758
(17.56)

-0.0369
(0.204)

-15.17
(17.31)

-0.105
(0.209)

-2.679
(17.01)

County Per Capita
Income

.0263**
(.011)

-.562*
(.329)

.0412***
(.013)

-0.54
(.731)

.0369***
(.0129)

-.0098
(.0007)

Con_Corruption

-2.842
(307.7)

-4290.4
(17742.4)

117.9
(353.2)

-25850.5
(40950.9)

141.8
(341.2)

-41460.9
(35870.54)

-0.302
(2.247)

-.5396.2
(4382.9)

1.853
(2.471)

-3915.4
(4263.5)

0.989
(2.487)

-3.051.9
(3.941.6)

-1.97
(6.63)

8026.4
(8011.6)

-5.46
(8.30)

3390.5
(8149.2)

-5.90
(8.03)

717.6
(788.4)

Last Year IUP only Dummy

-0.0149
(0.432)

37.70
(25.01)

-0.0584
(0.453)

8.651
(25.95)

-0.00720
(0.499)

4.618
(23.75)

Repeated Funding dummy

1.191***
(0.234)

Prop. of Afr. American
Con_Corruption* PerCncome

lambda
Year Controls
Facility Controls
State Controls
Observations
Goodness of fit measure:
Wald chi2 (p value)

Yes
No
Yes
591

-2.309e+07
(4.872e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

1.260***
(0.247)

Yes
Yes
No
219

Yes
No
Yes
547

3.336e+07
(4.811e+07)

87.24 (0.00)

1.222***
(0.269)

Yes
Yes
No
196

Yes
No
Yes
525

1.788e+07
(4.582e+07)

Yes
Yes
No
177

450.84 (0.00)
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4. Drinking Water Compliance and COVID-19 Pandemic: The Adverse
Impact of Compromised Functional Capacity
4.1.

Introduction
COVID-19 and associated public health safety control measures have had a significant impact

on society, businesses, and infrastructure systems. Whereas numerous businesses and administrative
offices closed or moved to virtual operations to moderate the spread of the virus, essential public
services including water systems needed to continue to provide uninterrupted services (USEPA, 2021).
However, the pandemic impacted water utilities’ workforce management and revenues (Berglund,
2021; Sowby, 2020; AWWA, 2020) similarly as it affected other sectors of the economy. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) identified wastewater and drinking water systems’
supply chain disruptions, water workforce staffing shortages, financial effects, and operational difficulties during the pandemic in 2020 (USEPA, 2021). Around a third of the nation's water suppliers
experienced shortages of treatment chemicals, financial impacts, delays or cancelations of capital projects, delays in maintenance, or interruptions of sampling and monitoring activities. Such risk to the
functioning of the essential services like drinking water systems merits detailed analysis to support
infrastructure resilience and public health. I study the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) violations of
public water systems (PWSs) and quantify the impact of an external shock such COVID-19 pandemic.
SDWA violations by PWSs include health-based and monitoring & reporting (M&R) violations. Health-based violations include observed exceedances of chemical pollutants, microbiological
contaminants, and residual disinfectants above the maximum allowed threshold. Health-based violations also include with failures to comply with required treatment techniques and procedures. M&R
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violations include documentation and public notice non-compliance. Such violations do not necessarily represent an immediate health risk but may obscure underlying health related outcomes (Michielssen et al., 2020).
M&R violations can have a grave human health impact if it causes underreporting of healthbased drinking water violations. Thus, it is important to consider the presence of M&R violations
while studying drinking water systems’ health-based non-compliances (Pennino et al, 2020, Michielssen, 2020). The number of health-based violations by public water systems have been gradually
declining over the years. However, M&R breaches are the most frequently documented violations,
implying that in many cases regulators and consumers do not know whether drinking water standards
are being met (USEPA, 2015). Despite being a serious concern, the relationship between M&R and
health-based violations has not been evaluated. I examine the relationship between M&R and healthbased violations in the presence of an external pandemic shock.
External shocks like COVID-19 can impact the compliance of PWSs in two principal ways.
As a direct effect, treatment plants may experience more violations due to shortages of chemicals,
equipment, and labor. As an indirect effect, staffing and supply shortages can disrupt M&R activities
and increase M&R violations thereby increasing underreporting of health-based violations. Indeed,
during the COVID-19 outbreak, the USEPA declared temporarily suspension of enforcement activities for failure by public water systems to monitor drinking water for some contaminants (Kecinski,
2020, McCary, 2021). The policy states that fines will not be sought for noncompliance with routine
M&R duties imposed due to COVID-19 pandemic. Around one-tenth (11%) of water and wastewater
utilities have experienced issues related to sample collection during the pandemic in 2020 (USEPA,
2021). Hence, the impact of COVID-19 on reported heath-based violations is ambiguous. The effects
of COVID-19 on M&R versus health-based violations have not been empirically analyzed.
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Our primary research question is whether COVID-19 pandemic influenced the health-based
violations of SDWA. U.S. water systems confront difficulties in providing access to clean drinking
water because of deteriorating infrastructure, contaminated source water, and strained community
budgets. Moreover, the pandemic inflicts additional challenges to water systems both in terms of the
health risk posed by virus itself and the anticipated financial impacts (Switzer et al., 2020). If the institutional capacity of drinking water is curtailed in terms of regulatory oversight, operations & maintenance, treatment, sampling, laboratory analysis, and others; it could mean the unavailability of water
for protecting public health. However, no nationwide assessment has yet been conducted on alterations in drinking water quality violations in face of compromised capacity in the COVID-19 pandemic.
I am also interested in examining the role of M&R compliance on documented health-based
violations. Since health-based violations records may depend on the quality of M&R compliance
(Wallsten, S., & Kosec, 2008; Michielssen, 2020; VanDerslice, 2011), it is important to study the influence of M&R compliance on health-based compliance to disentangle changes in health-based violations due to the COVID pandemic. Prior literature that examines health-based violation does not
account for this effect (Elbakidze and Beeson, 2021; Allaire, 2018; Michielssen, 2020; Grooms, 2016;
Judd and Kenny, 1981; Wallsten & Kosec, 2008). I take advantage of COVID-19 pandemic as an
external shock to isolate the mediating effect of M&R compliance and separate the direct and indirect
effects of an external shock on health-based non-compliance.
Using monthly panel data between 2011 to 2020 from 50 states, I examine the role of the
COVID-19 pandemic on PWSs compliance with SDWA in face of compromised operating capacity.
With county scale COVID case numbers as one of the explanatory variables, I study the changes in
reporting and health-based non-compliance. I explicitly account for the mediating effect of M&R non-
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compliance (the indirect effect) and test for the significance of the direct effect of COVID as an
external shock on health-based violations of SDWA.
I observe that counties with more COVID cases experienced decreased facility level SDWA
health-based violations relative to the counties with fewer COVID cases. Also, reported number of
health-based drinking water violations decreased after February 2020 when the pandemic hit US. At
the same time, the COVID pandemic had a significant positive effect on SDWA M&R violations.
Decreases in health-based violations can be due to weakened monitoring or reporting activities. Our
mediation analysis suggests that the direct effect of COVID on health-based drinking water violations
vanishes once I account for M&R violations as one of the regressors for health-based violations. I
conclude that COVID-19 had no direct effect on health-based violations but did weaken monitoring
and reporting. Compromised operational capacity from staff and equipment shortage, financial constraints, limited access to sample collection locations, and EPA's temporary enforcement discretion
policy for regular monitoring activities are the possible channels that can impact M&R activities during
the pandemic. Staffing, chemical treatment, and operational fund shortage can also increase the number of health-based violations. However, in the presence of infrequent M&R activities, such healthbased violations can remain undetected. Our negative significant effect of number of COVID cases
on health-based violations indicate such possibility which then reinforce with further evidence of having positive significant effect of COVID cases on monitoring and reporting violations. COVID has
only negative indirect effects on health-based violations due to weakened M&R compliance. Our study
suggests that impact of COVID on drinking water quality in terms of health-based compliance under
SDWA is mediated by missed or delayed monitoring & reporting actions.
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the background on SDWA. Section 3 describes the empirical estimation procedure. Section 4 describes the sample, data and variables used.
Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.

4.2.

Background on SDWA
Introduced in 1974, Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) includes requirements for monitoring,

reporting, treatment techniques, and drinking water standards for more than 90 contaminants (Michielssen et al., 2020). The EPA controls some pollutants, such as nitrate, arsenic, and lead, for which it
has established a maximum contaminant level goal (MCLG) that would result in no estimated health
impact during a lifetime of daily exposure (USEPA, 2017). The EPA then establishes the maximum
contaminant level (MCL), the established enforceable limit of the pollutant authorized to be delivered
by PWSs, as near to the MCLG as feasible while taking treatment cost into account (USEPA, 2017).
A required treatment technique is then used by the PWS in absence of any reliable method of detecting
contaminants, or when setting an MCL is not economically or technically feasible, (USEPA, 2017).
States take charge of enforcing the water standards set by the federal government and states can also
set their own standards that are at least as stringent as SDWA (Elbakidze and Beeson, 2021). A violation is issued when a water system fails to meet the SDWA requirements and standard. Because of
disparities in enforcement, financial resources, source water quality, and treatment costs, the occurrence and reporting of violations may differ across states (Allaire et al., 2018).
A PWS is flagged for a violation if it does not comply with an existing SDWA standard. Not
all SDWA violations indicate a contaminant was found above its MCL. Along with the health-based
standards, drinking water systems must perform regular monitoring and reporting following the EPA's
requirements. Even if a jurisdiction has a strong environmental legislative framework, it is ineffective
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if there is no budget to monitor and enforce the rules (López-Feldman et al. 2020). Monitoring, reporting, and enforcing health-related compliance is essential to preserve public health through clean
drinking water (UHF, 2006). PWSs must monitor their drinking water and report the results of water
quality tests to state drinking water authorities. Based on the PWSs’ self-reported statements state
authority asses their health-based compliances and submit a report to EPA (Grooms, 2016). PWSs
incur M&R violation if they fail to properly monitor and report the water quality test results to the
authorities (FU et al., 2020, CDPH, 2002; Grooms, 2016).

4.3.

Empirical Strategy
I use a mediation model (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Kenny et al., 1998; Judd, and Kenny, 1981b)

to assess the causal mechanisms behind the effect of the pandemic on health-based drinking water
violations. Mediation models consist of a treatment variable T (in our case, a COVID shock), a final
outcome Y (in our case, health-based violations) and a mediating variable M (in our case, M&R violations) that represents a mechanism through which T affects Y in addition to the direct effect of T on
Y. The mediating variable M is causally affected by T, and mediates part of the total effect of T on Y.
Essentially, the model decomposes the ‘total effect’ of T on Y into the ‘direct, and an ‘indirect’ or
mediating effects, running through M.
I start with the following baseline model (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Kenny et al., 1998; Judd,
and Kenny, 1981b):
𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 = 𝛽𝑌𝑇 𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽𝑌𝑋 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦

(4.1)

where, Yicmy represents the health-based drinking water violations of facility i in county c in month
m and year y. As the core explanatory variable, T represents number of COVID cases in county c in
month m year y. X represents a series of control variables. αy and si are year and state fixed effect
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respectively, and εicmy represents the error term. Our panel data estimation includes methods such as
fixed effect poisson model, random effect poisson model (RE), fixed effect probit model (FE), and
random effect probit model.
Our set of control variables include facility size, source of water, demographics, per capita
income and lagged SDWA violation. Violations in the prior year can be significantly associated with
current year violations and repeat violations are spatially clustered (Allaire et al., 2018). Such spatial
clustering of repeated violations indicates the possibility of the presence of some spatial factor that
can cause endogeneity among different types of violations. Adding lagged drinking water violations as
regressor helps to control for the enforcement and regulation standards. However, I do not include
the lagged dependent variable (ex. lagged health-based violation in equation 4.1) in any fixed effect
model. Dynamic estimation with lagged dependent variable as a regressor in fixed-effect count model
can result in a correlation between the unobserved effect and the dependent variable (Wooldridge,
2005).
4.3.1. Mediation effects
I construct the following models to isolate the mediating effect of M&R on drinking water
violations:
𝑇
𝑋
𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 = 𝛽𝑀
𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽𝑀
𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦

(4.2)

𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 = 𝛽′𝑇𝑌 𝑇𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽𝑌𝑀 𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽𝑌𝑋 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦

(4.3)

𝑇
where, 𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 represents the mediating variable. If the coefficient 𝛽𝑀
(effect of COVID cases on

M&R violation) in equation (4.2) and the coefficient 𝛽𝑌𝑀 (effect of M&R violation on health-based
violations) in equation (4.3) are both significant, then mediation effects exist. Next, I compare the
coefficient 𝛽𝑌𝑇 in equation (4.1) with the coefficient 𝛽′𝑇𝑌 in equation (4.3). If the coefficient 𝛽′𝑇𝑌 is no
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longer significant, then the role that COVID pandemic has on the health-based violations is fully
identified through the mediating variable, and there is no direct effect. If the coefficient 𝛽′𝑇𝑌 is still
significant but the value changes, then the role that the pandemic has on the health-based violations
is partly due to the mediating variable. In that case, the direct effect of T on Y, independent of M, is
𝑇
given by 𝛽𝑦𝑇 and indirect effect through M is given by 𝛽𝑀
· 𝛽𝑌𝑀 .

4.3.2. Partially Confounded Instrumental Variable Analysis
Identification of the mediation effect can be challenging due to the correlation between error
terms 𝜃𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 and 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 (Gunzler et al., 2013). The traditional approach to mediation analysis (Baron
& Kenny; 1986) assumes 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 and 𝜃𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑦 in equations 4.2 and 4.3 to be statistically independent,
which requires T and M to be exogenous. This assumption may not hold in our case.
While presence of the COVID pandemic is a random incident, both the number of COVID
cases in a county and the M&R violations in PWSs may depend on county’s institutional/ governance
capacities and strategies. Proactive governments are more likely to take measures to control the spread
of COVID-19 as well as likely to control of the challenges faced by PWSs. Due to the time sensitive
nature of implementing containment measures, any delay in enforcing - social distancing policies,
school closings, and other policies that are aimed to restrict the spread of a COVID—can add up to
major disparities in the number of cases and deaths (Adolph et al., 2020, Dave et al., 2020). Counties
that are more likely to adopt and implement such policies in the earlier phase of the pandemic are
usually more liberal (Brandtner et al., 2021). Political incentives greatly influence the local government’s role in environmental policy. It has been observed that counties with democratic preference
are less likely to violate the SDWA than those counties with republican preference (Switzer, 2019).
EPA intends to waive penalties for violations of routine compliance monitoring, sampling, laboratory
analysis, training, and reporting in situations where COVID-19 was the root cause of noncompliance.
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Local governments own the public water systems and enforcement of the M&R violations during
COVID is directly influenced by local government’s capacity and attitude.
An instrumental variable Z can be introduced to address the endogeneity between T and M
(Autor et al., 2013; Dauth et al., 2014; Pierce and Schott, 2016). The crucial assumption of this model
is that the instrumental variable must be defined as not identifying the causal effect of an intermediate
outcome M on a final outcome Y. It assumes that unobserved factors, such as county capacity and
strategies, that affect COVID shocks (T) and M&R violations (M) are also allowed to affect healthbased violations (Y), but it should not explain how M&R violations (M) influences health-based violation (Y). In this case, I do not expect county capacity to explain how M&R violations influence
health-based violations.
Partially confounded IV model relies on a single instrument (Z) to perform a mediation analysis which decomposes the total effect of T (i.e COVID cases) on Y (i.e. Health-based violation) into
the mediate indirect effect of T on Y that operates through M (i.e. M&R violation) and the direct
effect that does not goes through M. I run two separate 2SLS regressions: 1) the first set (i.e. equations
4.4 and 4.5) to estimate the direct effect of T on M, 2) the second set (i.e. equations 4.6 and 4.7) to
estimate the mediating effect of M on Y conditional on T and the direct effect of T on Y.
Here, Y is the dependent variable, M is the endogenous mediating variable, Z is the instrument
and, T enters as a conditioning variable. Equations 4.4 and 4.5 estimate the effect of COVID cases on
M&R violations with instrumental variable. In our setup, parameter 𝛽 𝑇̂𝑀 , i.e., the effect of COVID on
M&R compliance, is straightforward to estimate using standard 2SLS regressions:
𝑇𝑐𝑦𝑠𝑚 = 𝛽𝑇𝑍 . 𝑍𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝛽𝑇𝐾 𝐾𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝜇𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚

(4.4)

𝐾
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝛽 𝑇̂𝑀 . 𝑇𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝛽𝑀
. 𝐾𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚

(4.5)
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𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐾𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 denotes the control variables. The first stage is estimating 𝑇𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 , and the second stage
estimates 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚 as the outcome.
𝑇
To quantify the effect of T on Y, 𝛽^𝑀
𝑌 and 𝛽^𝑌 can be identified by evaluating the following

2SLS model (Dippel, 2022). In this setup, 𝛽𝑌𝑀 is the effect of M&R compliance on health-based compliance and 𝛽𝑌𝑇 is effect of number of COVID cases on health-based compliance.
𝑍
𝑇
𝐾
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝛾 𝑀
. 𝑍𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝛾𝑀
. 𝑇𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝛾𝑀
𝐾𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝜇𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚

(4.6)

𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚 = 𝛽 𝑀
̂𝑌 . 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝛽^𝑇𝑌 . 𝑇𝑐𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝛽𝑌𝐾 𝐾𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑦𝑚

(4.7)

While COVID is a random incident, both number of COVID cases in a county and the M&R
violations in drinking water system may depend on regional public sector’s institutional/ governance
capacity. The solution advanced in the literature is to use an instrument (Z) that is orthogonal to M&R
violations (Dippel et al., 2022; Azzarri, 2022; Figueiredo & Lima, 2022). In our analysis, I have separately used county level population density and median daily distance traveled by an individual, as
instruments for number of COVID cases in two different models.
The key intuition underlying Z’s explanatory power for M conditional on T (equation 4.6) is
that, when Z is different relative to (i.e., conditional on) T, these will partly reflect unobserved confounding effect, i.e., the source of the bias. So conditional on T, Z cause additional change in M,
because they reflect unobserved confounding factors that have led to a change in T (Dippel et al.,
2022).
The intuition underlying individual’s daily mobility’s explanatory power for COVID cases is
that large mobility reductions have been detected to be associated with the COVID-19 threat (Warren
& Skillman, 2020). I do not expect individual’s mobility to directly affect the county level regulations
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that can change the monitoring standards. M&R violations are only expected to be changed with a
change in individuals’ mobility conditioning on number of COVID cases. One possible limitation of
using individual’s mobility as the instrument is that mobility can get influenced by the social distancing
policies, which is enforced by the local governments. Our second instrumental variable is population
density in a county. Empirical studies suggest that population density has a significant positive effect
on the rate of spread of COVID (Sy, 2021: Wong & Li, 2020; Babbitt, 202). However, population
density is expected to be uncorrelated with M&R violations.

4.4.

Data
Non-compliance data for PWSs in all states are obtained from the USEPA's Safe Drinking

Water Information System (SDWIS). These data from 201118 to 2020 include M&R and health-based
violations for over 90 contaminants. Our water system dataset includes 1,610,900 monthly observations on public water systems, including the size, location, the number of violations, and water source.
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the facilities and counties in our dataset. I present
the data for pre COVID (before March 2020) and post COVID (after March 2019) separately. I identify 447,782 monthly observations for water systems in post-COVID time period, representing about
27% percent of the total sample19. The water system characteristics like size of the system and source
of water are combined with the violation information to construct a panel data used in the regression.
The water system characteristics like size of the system and source of water are time invariant categorical water system level variables. Categorical variable Water source types include surface water
(coded as 1), purchased surface water (coded as 2), ground water (coded as 3), purchased ground water
(coded as 4), ground water under direct influence of surface water (coded as 5) and purchased ground

18In

2011 EPA reversed its controversial decision to not regulate perchlorate, one of the most dangerous contaminants that are commonly found in America’s water supply.
19
Larger portion of the SDWA data are from recent years as the number of observations per year has gradually
increased over the time.
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water under direct influence of surface water (coded as 6). Size of the system identifies the service
population size. Size of the PWS varies from very small (500 or fewer people), small (between 501 and
3300 people), medium (between 3301 and 10 000 people) and large (more than 10000 people). Size of
the PWS is a categorical variable coded with values 1:4, respectively corresponding to very small, small,
medium and large facility.
Table 4.1. Summary Statistics from 2011-2020
Before Pandemic

After Pandemic

(N = 1,163,118)

(N = 447,782)

Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Public water systemhealth-based violation
(system/month)
M&R violation (system/month)

0.011

0.1103

0

5

0.0015

0.0416

0

3

0.022

0.17

0

4

0.024

0.17

0

5

Source of water

3.3

.83684

1

6

3.5

1.09

1

6

Size of the system

1.34

.74

1

4

1.6

1.00

1

4

0.86

0.15

0.034

0.998

0.85

0.16

0.040

0.994

41328

12426

17691

225987

40989

12166

17691

225987

0

0

0

0

0.007

0.009

1.01E07

0.132

98.159

293.407

0.0135

5614.42

232.187

443.651

0.607

17377.88

Proportion of white population (county/ year)
Per capita income
(County/Yr)
Per capita COVID cases
(Count/county population/ month)
Population density
(/County/sq mile/ year)
Median distance traveled
(individual/ month)

The number of average monthly PWSs health-based violations went down from .113 to .0416
respectively when compared between pre-COVID pandemic and post-COVID pandemic time. On
the other hand, mean number of M&R violation slightly increased from 0.022 in pre-pandemic time
to 0.024 during post-pandemic time. The proportion of drinking water systems with any M&R violations has increased from 1.88% in pre-pandemic time to 2.1% in post-COVID period.
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Our COVID data are observed at the county level, which is number of COVID infections
per county per month. The New York Times releases data with daily county-level confirmed
COVID-19 cases. This COVID-19 dataset is made available by The New York Times (NYT, 2020).
County data for per capita income are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
County level population data are collected for census bureau. Descartes Labs releases mobility statistics (representing the distance a typical member of a given population moves in a day) at the U.S.
county level by using mobile device locations to measure mobility (Warren & Skillman, 2020).

4.5.

Results
I begin by estimating the direct effect of per capita county COVID cases on health-based and

M&R SDWA violations. Table 4.2 presents the estimated results of equation 1 with the facility
monthly health-based violations as the dependent variable20. Column 1 shows the estimated results
for the per capita COVID cases on probability of a facility having any health-based violations. The
negative coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 5% level, implies a decrease in the probability of having a health-based violation with increasing number of COVID cases. Column 2 and 3
shows the estimated results for the per capita COVID cases on number of health-based violations for
each facility using random and fixed effect models respectively. Facility fixed effect model controls
the unobserved facility level confounders that can cause endogeneity in our model. I also show the
results for random effect models which allows to include more observations in the analysis compared
to the fixed effect model21. The county level COVID intensity is significantly negative for number of
health-based violations, which likely reflects the under reporting or under monitoring issues caused
during the pandemic (López-Feldman, 2020; Kecinski et al, 2020; USEPA, 2021).

20

Similar analysis is conducted with a subsample drinking water system’s observations from 2017 to 2020 and results are reported in table A4.1.
21 Fixed effect model drops observation for PWSs without any variation over the time period in the dependent variable.
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Columns 4 to 6 in Table 4.2 reports estimation results of equation 2 with the monthly M&R
violations by each facility. Column 4 shows the estimated results for the per capita COVID cases on
probability of a facility having any M&R violations, where the estimate is significantly positive. Column
5 and 6 reflects the effect on number of M&R violations using panel poisson models. I observe that
both probability of having any M&R violations and number of M&R violation increases significantly
with the increasing number of COVID cases.
This analysis suggests that COVID-19 had a significant impact on SDWA compliance of
PWSs. One may wonder why health-based violations experienced a negative effect from the increasing
number of COVID cases. During the pandemic, concerns about existing and future shortages of
treatment chemicals, operational budget deficits, canceled capital projects, and delayed maintenance
have been documented (USEPA, 2021). These complications are expected to make compliance with
SDWA act more difficult and thus increase non-compliance. Yet, the results in table 4.2 imply a negative effect of COVID19 on health-based violations. Such result can be observed when health-related
non-compliance is undetected or unreported due to a lack of employees, operational budgets, equipment, or access to monitoring location. The EPA also temporarily relaxed enforcement of environmental regulations and fines during the COVID-19 outbreak (Kecinski er al., 2020). Indeed, the results
in table 4.2 show that M&R violations have increased due to COVID-19 pandemic. This increase in
monitoring and reporting violations maybe masking the direct effect of COVID-19 on health-based
violations.
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Table 4.2. Direct effect of number of COVID Cases using observation from 2011 to 2020
Health-based violation
M&R violation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
perccases
lag_healthviolation
white_proportion

Random Effect
Probit

Random Effect Poisson

Fixed Effect
Poisson

Random Effect
Probit

Random Effect Poisson

-23.43**
(9.38)
0.696***
(0.01)
-0.478***
(0.08)

-23.66**
(9.28)
0.821***
(0.02)
-0.580**
(0.05)

-26.55*
(15.56)

1.603**
(0.875)

2.76**
(1.44)

-0.262***
(0.04)

2.77e-05***

4.55E-06***

9.55e-06***

-0.59**
(0.03)
1.92**
(0.852)
4.55E-06***

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.0733***
(0.0236)
2.112**
(0.885)
5.92e-06***
(2.36e-07)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,274,602
16,945

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,274,602
16,945

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,274,602
16,945

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,274,602
16,945

lag Monit Violation
percapitaincome
Size Control
Source Control
Year Control
State Control
Facility Control
Observations
Number of pwsid

Yes
No
Yes
640,022
7,089

0.00

(6)
Fixed Effect Poisson
11.66***
(1.244)
-13.92***
(1.974)
0.0004***
(3.58e06)
Yes
No
Yes
561,326
7,373

Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.

Previous studies suggest that higher drinking water violations are related with lower socioeconomic level and minority percentages (McDonald & Jones, 2018; Switzer & Teodoro, 2018). Communities of color and marginalized groups are also associated with larger number of COVID cases
and deaths (Graham, 2021; Tan et al., 2021). To control for such confounding effects of regulations
and policies, I include county level per capita income and proportion of white population as regressors
in our analyses. I find that counties with larger share of white population have lower number of healthbased and M&R violations. Our finding aligns with previous environmental justice research in reporting the presence of racial disparities in compliance with the SDWA (Switzer & Teodoro, 2017;
McDonald & Jones, 2018). However, I do not find evidence that low-income communities experience
disproportionate environmental harm. Counties with higher per capita incomes have substantially
higher number of SDWA violations, which can possibly be related to better M&R system.
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4.5.1. Mediation Effects
Table 4.3 shows estimation results from the mediation effect of M&R violations following
equation (4.3)22. From column 1, I see that M&R violations negatively affect the probability of having
health-based violations. The negative coefficient for M&R violations in columns 2 and 3 also suggest
that M&R violations are associated with a lower number of health-based violations. These negative
coefficients imply that M&R violations lead to under-reporting of health-based violations. Finally, the
coefficient of per capita COVID cases is no longer significant when M&R violation is included as the
regressor. The role of COVID cases on the health-based drinking water violations is fully captured by
Table 4.3. Mediation effect model using observation from 2011 to 2020
(1)
(2)
(Random Effect
(Random Effect
Probit)
Poisson)
VARIABLES
Binary healthviol
Count healthviol
Monit Violation
-0.106***
-0.257**
(0.03)
(0.12)
lag Monit Violation
.088***
.085***
(0.02)
(0.07)
County COVID
-3.995
-23.02
Cases
(4.20)
(14.67)
lag_healthviola
0.622***
0.819
(0.02)
(0.93)
white_prop
-0.183***
16.07
(0.05)
(13.19)
percapitaincome
9.89e-06***
0.000268
(0.00)
(0.00)
Size Control
Yes
Yes
Source Control
Yes
Yes
Year Control
Yes
Yes
State Control
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,274,889
1,274,889
Number of pwsid
16,949
16,949
Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.

(3)
(Fixed Effect
Poisson)
Count healthviol
-0.305***
(0.11)
1.01**
(0.49)
-26.65
(15.41)

5.212
(10.03)
0.000476***
(0.00)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
621,998
6,945

22

Similar analysis is conducted with a subsample drinking water system’s observations from 2017 to 2020 and results are reported in table A4.2.
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the mediating variable, thus there is no direct effect of from the COVID pandemic on health violations. This analysis suggests the outbreak of COVID-19 damages drinking water systems’ operation
in terms of frequency in testing and reporting. Health-based drinking water violation is decreasing
with escalating COVID case numbers, which is caused due to the unreported violations.
I find positive significant effect of lagged violations on current drinking water violations. This
is true for both health-based (models 1 and 2 of table 4.2, and model 1 of table 4.3) and monitoring
violations (models 4 and 5 of table 4.2). A significant positive impact of lagged M&R violations on
current heath-based violation is observed in all the models. Table 4.3 reports a significant positive
effect of M&R violation’s presence in the previous month on the presence of health-based violations
in current month. Such a negative effect indicates the presence of delayed monitoring or reporting of
the water systems’ noncompliance. Such delayed detection of non-compliance with health standards
can cause serious health problems.
4.5.2. Partially confounded IV model
I now introduce instrumental variables to handle the possible endogeneity between the
COVID cases and M&R violations. Table 4.4 report results for changes in M&R non-compliance
following equation (4.5). Here, our focus is on the extent to which the number of COVID cases
influence M&R non-compliance using instrumental variable approach. Columns 1 and 2 instrumented
number of COVID cases with median individual’s mobility and county’s population density respectively to evaluate the effect of COVID cases on probability of having any M&R violations using 2SLS
probit estimation. Models 3 and 4 instrumented number of COVID cases with median individual’s
mobility and county’s population density respectively to evaluate the effect of COVID cases on number of M&R violations using 2SLS poisson model. It restates our finding in table 4.2 (models 4 to 6),
that both the probability of PWSs having M&R violations as well as their number of M&R violations
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increases with increasing number of COVID cases. Spikes in M&R violations appear to occur with
spike in COVID cases. PWSs might undergo a difficulties and adjustment process when coping with
the pandemic. For example, if the infection spreads among staff, it may compel quarantine and jeopardize operations. While practicing social distancing locations or other locations that may be difficult
to get to sample collecting locations (Switzer et al. 2020) . Experiencing revenue generation or cash
flow issues related to the pandemic is another possible challenge that can jeopardize operations and
cause missed or delayed M&R of drinking water quality by the PWSs (USEPA, 2021). EPA’s temporary easing of enforcement discretion with respect to assessing civil penalties for noncompliance with
regular monitoing and reporting requirements can also cause a spike in M&R violations during pandemic (McCary, 2021).
Table 4.4. Effect of T on M using instrumental variable
IVprobit model
IVpoisson model
Count M&R violation
Binary M&R Violation
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
Mobility of individual

Population density

Mobility of
individual

Population
density

perccases

103.5**
(10.80)

221.4***
(50.94)

121,868***
(19,151)

68.06***
(14.12)

lagmonitoringviolation

1.489***
(0.503)

0.0758
(6.591)

2.225***
(0.0303)

2.812***
(0.0504)

white_proportion

-0.203
(0.193)

0.126
(1.210)

0.101
(0.112)

-0.569***
(0.150)

percapitaincome

7.78e-06***
(2.34e-06)

1.09e-06
(3.47e-05)

9.74e-06***
(6.87e-07)

1.59e-05***
(2.80e-06)

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1,551,390

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,529,734

Instruement

Size Control
Source Control
Year Control
State Control
Observations

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
1,551,390
1,529,734
Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.
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To ensure the reliability of the findings obtained from the simple mediation analysis approach
in Table 4.3, I use the partially confounded IV model regression approach to estimate the direct and
indirect effect of COVID cases per capita in table 4.5. In table 4.5 our focus is on the extent to which
the effect of number of COVID cases on health-based violations works through the effect of number
of COVID cases on M&R compliances using instrumental variable approach. It reports the coefficient
𝛽𝑀
̂𝑌 , the causal effect of M&R violation M on health-based violations Y following equation (4.7).
Columns 1 and 3 indicate that a drop in number of M&R violation respectively increases the probability of having health-based violation and the number of health-based violations when I use mobility
as an instrument for COVID cases. This effect is consistent in column 2 and 4 using population
density as instrument for COVID cases. The deeper importance of the point estimates 𝛽 𝑀
̂𝑌 is that
they allow us to assess the independent effect of COVID cases (T) on health-based violations (Y).
Table 4.5. Effect of T on Y using instrumental variable
IVprobit model
IVpoisson model

Instrument
bmonitoringviolation

perccases
lag_health_violation
lagbmonitoringviolation

white_proportion
percapitaincome

Binary Health-based Violation
(1)
(2)
Mobility of
Population
individual
density
-6.368**
(3.148)
1.748
(5.246)
0.609
(0.609)
2.572***
(0.898)
-0.261**
(0.115)
6.55e-06**
(3.02e-06)

-6.542***
(1.996)
1.738
(4.605)
0.569
(0.417)
2.610***
(0.559)
-0.229**
(0.0969)
6.57e-06***
(2.30e-06)

Size Control
Yes
Yes
Source Control
Yes
Yes
Year Control
Yes
Yes
State Control
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,551,390
1,529,734
Asterisks (*,**,***) indicate 10% , 5% and 1% significance.

Count Health-based Violation
(3)
(4)
Mobility of indiPopulation
vidual
density
-0.939***
(0.119)
11.01
(35.67)
1.476***
(0.0526)
3.450***
(0.176)
-0.439**
(0.206)
1.57e-05***
(1.49e-06)

-0.947***
(0.125)
16.25
(28.09)
1.556***
(0.0627)
3.689***
(0.186)
-0.0416
(0.212)
1.43e-05***
(1.00e-06)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,551,390

1,529,734

120

The indirect effect running through the M&R violation in table 4.5 (following equation 4.7)
reverifies the mediation effect. The total negative effect of COVID pandemic on health-based violations (in Table 4.2) can be explained through a mediating channel. The estimated effect of T on Y
conditioning on M (𝛽̂𝑌𝑇 ) (from equation 7), reported in Table 4.5, suggests that there is no direct effect
of COVID cases on the health-based violations. Relating the results from Table 4.4 to Table 4.5 I can
reinstate that the probability of complying with the health-based standards do not increases with increasing number of COVID cases. Pandemic rather intensifies monitoring and reporting non-compliances which keeps health-based violations concealed.
The regression result obtained by the simple mediation effect analysis is consistent with that
of the confounded IV model regression approach. Consequently, the finding acquired from our analysis considered stable which concludes that COVID-19 had no direct effect on health-based violations. The negative effect of COVID-19 pandemic on health-based violation is fully mediated through
M&R violations.

4.6.

Conclusion
Although the U.S. has among the safest drinking water supplies in the world, harmful contam-

inants that are detrimental to public health may still be found in public water supplies, as demonstrated
by incidents like Flint water crisis (Weinmeyer et al., 2017). Compliance with the SDWA is an important public health and environmental quality objective. To ensure sustainability and maintain compliance with all applicable drinking water laws and regulations, PWSs must have adequate capacity to
perform their required technical, managerial, and financial duties. The COVID-19 pandemic put additional pressures on essential public services including PWSs as recent literature has documented
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some of the possible challenges for drinking water systems by analyzing professional experience, publicly available information, and interviews (Berglund, 2021; USEPA 2021, Renukappa et al., 2021).
Our study conducts empirical analyses to explore the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on drinking
water systems in terms of their compliances with SDWA.
I initially find that PWSs’ health-based violations decline with an increasing number of
COVID cases. In order to ensure that our water supplies are maintaining the SDWA standards, PWSs
need to go through monitoring procedures on a regular basis. Our focus is to ask whether the effect
of the COVID pandemic on drinking water quality in terms of health-based compliance with SDWA
is mediated by missed or delayed M&R actions. There is good reason to believe that this is the case as
the estimated effects of COVID cases on health-based non-compliance and M&R violations complement each other.
In an attempt to identify the mechanism linking health-based noncompliance to COVID exposure, I use a mediation analysis approach. Initially without considering the M&R quality of the
drinking water systems, health-based violations of the PWSs decline with increasing number of
COVID cases. However, after adding the M&R violations in the set-up, I no longer find that COVID
cases per capita have a significant effect on the health-based violations. On one hand, M&R violations
are found to positively impacted by the number of COVID cases, on the other hand health-based
drinking water violations go down with increasing number of M&R violations. Our mediation analysis
indicated full mediating effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on health-based drinking water violations
through M&R violations.
While prior studies repeatedly mentioned the importance of having a good monitoring system
to ensure that drinking water systems follow the SDWA maximum contaminant standards
(Grooms,2016; VanDerslice, 2011), any link between M&R with health-based violation of SDWA
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standards are yet to be analyzed. Our focus is to establish the empirical link between health based
SDWA violations to the M&R violations. I find a negative significant relationship between healthbased violation and M&R violations. Our result provides evidence that M&R violations result in under-reporting of health-based drinking water violations. I also observe that facilities who missed monitoring & reporting requirements in previous period are more likely to breach health-based drinking
water standards in current period. This result further reinforces the possible concealment of healthbased noncompliance in presence of breach in monitoring & reporting requirements.
Under-reporting of health-based violations can reduce EPA’s ability to monitor and report
progress toward a strategic objective of reducing exposure to contaminants in drinking water (GAO,
2011). The impact of COVID-19 can serve as a forewarning to realize the need of a more resilient
water infrastructure that can recover from external shocks caused by a future pandemic or other types
of natural and humanmade disasters. Studying the effect of COVID-19 pandemic on the performance
of PWSs in terms of the water quality as well as M&R system is a good opportunity to analyze the
sustainability of drinking water systems in terms of their compliance with SDWA standards. Our results clearly show that drinking water systems are adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. I
cannot certainly imply if pandemic has caused PWSs to compromise with the health standards or not.
In order to ensure that our water supplies are maintain the safe drinking water standards, PWSs need
to go through the monitoring procedure in a regular basis. However, such regular monitoring and
reporting activities are adversely affected by the pandemic. Before taking any effective remedy, it is
important to identify the poorly performing systems. Such disruption in the monitoring and reporting
activities can make it difficult to ensure the supply of clean drinking water.
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Appendix 4A
Table A4.1. Direct effect of number of COVID Cases using data between 2017 to 2020
Health-based violation
M&R violation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
perccases
lag_healthviolation
white_proportion

Random Effect
Probit

Random Effect Poisson

Fixed Effect
Poisson

Random Effect
Probit

Random Effect Poisson

4.956**
(2.221)
0.794***
(0.0409)
-0.517***
(0.159)

2.159***
(0.497)
1.791*
(0.943)
-1.806***
(0.547)

1.192*
(0.716)

1.004***
(0.207)

2.15***
(0.355)

-76.82*
(41.45)

1.87e-05***
(1.48e-06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
967,679
16,699

0.000190***
(1.15e-05)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
967,679
16,699

-0.0514
(0.110)
0.113**
(0.052)
8.24e-05***
(1.35e-06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
934,408
16,747

-1.258***
(0.161)
0.0086
(0.0496)
0.0003***
(3.93e-06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
934,408
16,747

lag Monit Violation
percapitaincome
Size Control
Source Control
Year Control
State Control
Facility Control
Observations
Number of pwsid

0.000671***
(7.53e-05)
Yes
No
Yes
307,507
7,003

(6)
Fixed Effect Poisson
2.16***
(0.355)
-8.681**
(4.423)
0.0005***
(5.58e-06)
Yes
No
Yes
297,577
6,010
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Table A4.2. Mediation effect model using data between 2017 to 2020

VARIABLES
Monit Violation
lag Monit Violation
County COVID Cases
lag_healthviola
white_prop
percapitaincome
Size Control
Source Control
Year Control
State Control
Observations
Number of pwsid

(1)
(Random Effect
Probit)
Binary healthviol

(2)
(Random Effect
Poisson)
Count healthviol

(3)
(Fixed Effect
Poisson)
Count healthviol

-1.368***
(0.436)

-1.211***
(0.219)

-1.245***
(0.221)

0.277***
(0.0672)

0.483
(0.656)

0.372**
(0.153)

9.453
(7.692)

4.442
(14.67)

-2.426
(16.66)

0.795***
(0.143)
-0.492***
(0.156)
1.78e-05***
(2.37e-06)

-11.64
(44.93)
-1.711**
(0.668)
0.0002
(0.001)

-1.633
(12.77)
0.0007***
(7.63e-05)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
926,165
16,699

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
926,165
16,699

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
307,507
7,003
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5. Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on the challenges with Clean Water Act (CWA) and Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) compliance and financial programs. Focusing on CWA, the essay in chapter 2
examines the financial support provided by the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF). Using
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) compliance data for wastewater treatment facilities and the difference-in-difference estimation technique, I evaluate the impact of funding provision on non-compliance. This chapter also examines the role of non-compliance in the distribution of CWSRF across wastewater treatment facilities. The findings suggest that funded facilities have poorer compliance records than the unfunded ones before receiving CWSRF support. The
findings also show that non-compliance of funded facilities declines within two years of receiving
the financial support.
While working with the wastewater compliance and funding project, I decided to dive deeper
into how limited CWSRF support is distributed. The second essay in chapter 3 evaluates the stated
versus revealed priorities of funding agencies when providing financial support to wastewater treatment facilities. Focusing on CWA, this work analyzes the role of non-compliance, observed environmental quality, community socio-economic status, and corruption on distribution of CWSRF loans.
Before distributing the loans to qualified facilities, state funding agencies must submit Intended Use
Plans (IUPs) for approval by the EPA. The actual distribution of support often differs from IUP
stated lists. Consistencies and disparities between actual funding and the IUP lists are analyzed in
chapter 3. States are found to have the intent of and to provide CWSRF assistance to wastewater
treatment plants with poorer CWA compliance records in previous years. Also, larger facilities are
prioritized in intended as well as observed allocation of assistance. Although impairment of dis-
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charge receiving streams is not a significant factor in assistance distribution plans, the observed allocation of funds is positively correlated with receiving stream’s impairment. Poorer communities are
prioritized in intended as well as observed assistance allocation. However, income-based prioritization is weaker in states with greater corruption.
The final essay in chapter 4 focuses on regulatory compliances under SDWA. Using the
COVID-19 pandemic as an external shock to the public water systems’ operations, this research examines the role of disrupted monitoring and reporting (M&R) activities on underreporting of healthbased violations. Using a mediation effect modeling technique, we analyze the causal mechanisms
behind the effect of the pandemic on health-based drinking water violations. I conclude that
COVID-19 had no direct impact on health-based violations. The observed negative correlation between COVID cases and health-cased violations is fully mediated through delayed or missed M&R
activities. Compromised operational capacity during pandemic hindered the monitoring and reporting activities of the public water supply that concealed the health-based SDWA violations.
All three essays in this dissertation one way or another address water quality compliance. The
first two show how wastewater facilities’ effluent discharging permit non-compliances and CWSRF
allocation decisions are interdependent. Findings from the third essay provide evidence for the interconnection between health-based SDWA noncompliance and monitoring and reporting based noncompliance. Explicitly accounting for monitoring and reporting of drinking water quality and noncompliance is important for identifying the underperforming public water supplies with higher rates
of health-based drinking water violations.
This research documents interconnection between different water policy regulations. In the
US, the wastewater treatment facilities are governed under the CWA while drinking water facilities
are governed under the SDWA. In accordance with the CWA, permits set restrictions on discharge
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of regulated pollutants from a point source. The SDWA sets regulatory standards for drinking water
pollutants. The CWA and the SDWA noncompliance respectively represent self-reported health-related wastewater and drinking water violations. The findings in chapters 2 and 4 suggest that financial support and regulatory oversite are necessary to improve environmental compliance. The chapter 2 essay provides empirical evidence that financial assistance for infrastructure improvement is instrumental for ensuring water quality compliances by wastewater treatment plants. The importance
of appropriate regulatory oversight is evident in the chapter 4 essay where we show that public water
systems’ health-based non-compliances can be under reported if proper M&R activities are not ensured. M&R compliance should be factored in identifying drinking water facilities that are under preforming in terms of health-based violations. Incorporating the findings from these studies suggest
that financial assistance should be allocated to those facilities that need assistance based on healthbased compliance after taking regulatory oversite or reporting quality into consideration. Otherwise,
effectiveness of financial assistance cannot be ensured.
This work documents that socio-economic factors are important for environmental compliance. Chapter 2 demonstrates the role of per capita income in explaining wastewater permit noncompliance. Chapter 3 shows the impacts of socio-economic factors, like per capita income and
race, on financial allocation programs. Chapter 4 also documents the possible role of socio-economic factors in explaining reporting of the non-compliances by public drinking water systems.
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